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THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE OF THE
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
JACK STARK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution, the uniformity
clause,1 article VIII, section 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution is a terse
statement of organic law that has significantly influenced the statutory law
of taxation and has been the basis for considerable litigation. More than
one hundred Wisconsin appellate court uniformity clause cases have been
reported. Although several issues remain unlitigated, the reported cases
deal with a large number of complex issues. However, the body of uniform-
ity clause litigation desperately needs clarification 2 because of its complexity
and its importance to Wisconsin tax law and to major state aid programs.
At first glance, the clause seems simply to ensure equality, which is es-
pecially important for property tax payers because they, unlike other tax-
payers, play a zero-sum game. They play a zero-sum game because each
taxing jurisdiction levies taxes that will generate the amount of revenue it
wishes to collect from its taxpayers.3 The taxing jurisdiction then divides
* B.A. 1961, Northland College; M.A. 1963, Claremont; Ph.D 1969, University of Wiscon-
sin; J.D. 1976, University of Wisconsin.
1. Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1974) reads: Rule of taxation uniform; income, privi-
lege and occupation taxes.
The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the legislature may empower cities, villages or
towns to collect and return taxes on real estate located therein by optional methods. Taxes
shall be levied upon such property with such classifications as to forests and minerals in-
cluding or separate or severed from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe. Taxation of
agricultural land and undeveloped land, both as defined by law, need not be uniform with
the taxation of each other nor with the taxation of other real property. Taxation of
merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and finished products, and livestock
need not be uniform with the taxation of real property and other personal property, but the
taxation of all such merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and finished prod-
ucts and livestock shall be uniform except that the legislature may provide that the value
thereof shall be determined on an average basis. Taxes may also be imposed on incomes,
privileges and occupations, which taxes may be graduated and progressive, and reasonable
exemptions may be provided.
2. For a partial treatment of that case law, see Frank L. Bixby, Note, Wisconsin Constitution
Article VIII, Section 1-Partial Exemption of Value as an Inducement to Proper Subdivision, 1953
Wis. L. REv. 141; David L. Kinnamon, Note, The Uniformity Clause, Assessment Freeze Laws,
and Urban Renewal. A Critical View, 1965 Wis. L. Rnv. 885.
3. For examples of statutory authority to levy property taxes for various governmental bod-
ies, see Wis. STAT. §§ 120.10, 120.12(3), 120.44(1) (1991-92) (school districts); WIs. STAT.
§ 38.16 (1991-92) (vocational, technical, and adult education districts); Wis. STAT. § 70.62(1)
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that amount by the total assessed value of all the taxable property in the
jurisdiction to determine its mill rate. Next, it computes each taxpayer's
obligation by multiplying that mill rate by the assessed value of his or her
property. Therefore, if one taxpayer's assessment is too low, the mill rate
applicable to every piece of taxable property in the jurisdiction that contains
the inaccurately assessed property will be higher than it ought to be. Be-
cause any unfairness inevitably spreads throughout the taxing jurisdiction,
some early courts invalidated an entire levy if it was determined that one
taxpayer was treated nonuniformly.4
Equality has its attractions, but early in the history of uniformity clause
litigation the court recognized that absolute equality would often impede
economic development and property tax relief. The pressures on the legis-
lature and the court to facilitate economic development5 were strong during
the second half of the nineteenth century. During the twentieth century,
property taxes appeared more onerous because it became clear that their
burden was not distributed according to taxpayers' ability to pay. As a
result, pressure for property tax relief began to oppose pressure for equality.
These competing concerns also have been a major cause of the fairly large
number of poorly reasoned and wrongly decided uniformity clause cases.
This Article analyzes Wisconsin's uniformity clause by first tracing its
development in the two state constitutional conventions and its amend-
ments, and then explaining the tangled early history of uniformity clause
case law. Later sections deal with the taxes to which the clause applies, the
major issues that have been litigated, the geographical area over which uni-
formity must pertain, the kinds of permissible classification, and the reme-
dies available to successful uniformity clause litigants.
II. FRAMING THE ORIGINAL UNIFORMITY CLAUSE
To find a more complete meaning of the uniformity clause, one must
examine the precedents for, the framing of, and the amendments to the uni-
formity clause. Uniformity clauses appear to be indigenous to this coun-
(1991-92) (counties); Wis. STAT. § 62.11(5) (1991-92) (cities); Wis. STAT. § 61.46 (1991-92) (vil-
lages); Wis. STAT. § 60.10 (1991-92) (towns); Wis. STAT. § 70.58 (1991-92) (state, and particu-
larly, state forestation tax, which is the only state property tax, and mill rate); Wis. STAT.
§ 33.31(3) (1991-92) (inland lake districts). A gross property tax is the sum of a taxpayer's obliga-
tions to all of the jurisdictions that contain taxable property belonging to the taxpayer. Credits
are subtracted to determine the net bill.
4. See, e.g., Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 444 (1861); see also Kneeland v. City of Mil-
waukee, 15 Wis. 497 (1862) (following an unreported, unconvincing case rather than voiding taxes
retroactively).
5. For a detailed tracing of that impetus, see JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915 (1964).
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try.6 They comport with political ideals, such as equality and equity, that
motivated this country's Founders. In the first reported Wisconsin uni-
formity clause case, the court noted that "[t]he theory of our government is,
that socially and politically all are equal." 7 Also, drafters of state constitu-
tions were probably motivated by a concern that legislators or local officials
would fall victim to political pressures and grant favorable tax treatment to
influential property owners. This concern has some basis, as several early
cases attest.' Nevertheless, the exact motives for the first uniformity clause
have not been established. In fact, it is not clear which state first included
such a clause in its constitution. One commentator believes that Tennes-
see's, which was adopted in 1796, was the first,9 but another believes that
other states had earlier, albeit more vague, uniformity clauses."0 In any
event, when the convention that drafted the Wisconsin Constitution11 met,
it had precedents for including a uniformity clause. By one count, at the
time of that convention, ten states had uniformity clauses in their constitu-
tions and nineteen did not. 2 If one analyst of state uniformity clauses is
correct, however, Wisconsin was the first state to phrase a uniformity clause
as it did, with Ohio, Michigan, and New Jersey later phrasing their clauses
in a similar fashion. 3 After Wisconsin's constitution was ratified, the list of
states with uniformity clauses grew. Today only two states, Connecticut
and New York, and perhaps a third, Iowa, do not have uniformity clauses
in their constitutions. 14
The 1848 Wisconsin constitutional convention had another precedent
for a uniformity clause: the constitution that was adopted by the 1846 con-
vention but rejected by the people. The 1846 convention's Committee on
Finance, Taxation, and Public Debt drafted a clause, which was included in
the document, specifying that "[a]ll taxes to be levied in this state, at any
time, shall be as nearly equal as may be."1" The 1846 convention had
6. For a treatment of the question of origin, see William L. Matthews, Jr., The Function of
Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L.J. 31 (1949-50).
7. Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 378, 387 (1859).
8. One such case involved a tax official's deliberate omission of an opulent new hotel from the
tax rolls. See Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 186 (1860).
9. Matthews, supra note 6, at 41; see also Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37,
60, 8 N.W. 833, 838 (1881).
10. WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXA-
TION 612 (1959).
11. The people of the state voted not to ratify the constitution drafted by the first convention.
12. Taylor County, 52 Wis. at 62, 8 N.W. at 839.
13. See generally NEWHOUSE, supra note 10 (classifying uniformity clauses on the basis of
phrasing).
14. See generally id.; Matthews, supra note 6.
15. THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 90 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1919).
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cleared the ground for a clause of that type by defeating a resolution that
would have inserted a provision exempting real estate from taxation. 16 The
reports of the debates over the uniformity clause reveal that two delegates
supported such a clause in order to enhance social, political, and economic
equality. One newspaper reporter attributed to John H. Rountree the opin-
ions that "our present laws did not secure a just and equitable valuation of
property as the rule of taxation; and it was this kind of partiality and favor-
itism extended to particular kinds of property which he wishes to see pro-
hibited by the constitution." 17 Similarly, Warren Chase, alluding to the
defeat of the real estate exemption, pointed out that "they had already suc-
cessfully combated the principle of exempting certain privileged kinds of
property from taxation." 8
The 1848 convention began with the 1846 version of the clause. Ed-
ward Whiton added "and shall be levied upon such property as the legisla-
ture shall prescribe." 19 After Chase's suggestion to substitute "practicable"
for "may be"2 was accepted, Whiton successfully moved to replace the first
half of the clause with "the rule of taxation shall be uniform throughout
this state."21 The Committee on Revision and Arrangement struck the last
three words.22 The result was as follows: "The rule of taxation shall be
uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature
shall prescribe." Even at that point, the uniformity provision had grown
beyond a clause. Strictly speaking, "The rule of taxation shall be uniform"
is the uniformity clause. The rest of the sentence, including the material
added later by amendment, is elaboration. This Article, however, will also
consider other parts of article VIII, section 1, rather than just the uniform-
ity clause in the most strict sense.
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE
Article VIII, section 1 has been amended five times.23 At first it was not
clear which taxes had to be uniform, and some early litigation cast doubt on
the constitutionality of income taxes. Thus, in 1908, a sentence was added
authorizing income taxes, privilege taxes, and occupational taxes, and grad-
16. THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD 222 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928).
17. Id. at 402.
18. Id. at 413.
19. Id. at 403.
20. Id. at 404.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 727.
23. For a list of those amendments, see WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU,
STATE OF WISCONSIN 1993-94 BLUE BOOK 200-39 (1993).
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uated rates and exemptions for them. In 1927, the first sentence was ex-
panded to authorize classification of property as to forests and minerals.
That provision was moved into a separate sentence in 1941 in order to in-
sert a clause allowing municipalities to use optional methods of collecting
taxes.2 An amendment ratified in 1961 allows merchants' stock-in-trade,
manufacturers' materials and finished products, and livestock to be treated
nonuniformly as compared to other property. Some persons wished to ex-
empt those kinds of property, sometimes called "the three stocks," in order
to create an economic incentive, and they preferred to achieve exemption by
gradually reducing the tax on the property. The intermediate reduction
steps created a partial exemption, which would have violated the uniformity
clause.25 In 1974, a sentence that allows nonuniform treatment of agricul-
tural land and undeveloped land was added. This amendment was made to
provide relief to owners of those kinds of land that were assessed according
to their highest and best use instead of according to their present use.
2 6
Since 1974, minor changes in the taxation of agricultural land have been
enacted.27
IV. THE EARLY CASE LAW
The efforts of the Wisconsin Supreme Court during the early years of
statehood to initiate satisfactory uniformity clause case law are one of the
more unusual phenomena in the history of Wisconsin law.28 Those efforts
indicate some reasons for the problems of interpretation presented by the
clause. The failure of a supreme court justice to write an opinion in the first
uniformity clause case to be heard, the subsequent appending of a memo-
randum about that case to the second uniformity clause case to be heard,
and the fundamental conflict between the two cases created a great deal of
confusion. It took fifty-one years to clear away the confusion and to estab-
lish the first reported, not the first decided, case as the seminal one.
At issue in the first reported case, Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors,29
was a statutory provision3" in the Janesville Charter that limited property
taxes on agricultural land. The facts seemed to be exactly of the kind that
24. WiS. STAT. §§ 74.11(2), 74.12 (1991-92).
25. Wis. STAT. § 70.111(17) (1991-92).
26. All property must be assessed at fair market value. Wis. STAT. § 70.32(1) (1991-92).
27. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 70.32(lr) (1991-92).
28. For other accounts of that phenomenon, see Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d
408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967); State v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 128 Wis. 449, 108 N.W. 594 (1906);
Kinnamon, supra note 2, at 889-901.
29. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
30. See 1854 Wis. Laws 179, § 5.
1993]
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the drafters of the clause sought to preclude. The tax on agricultural land
was less than that on other land, so a classification was made and different
"rules" were applied to different kinds of property. The court invalidated
the Janesville provision and stated, "The valuation must be uniform, the
rate must be uniform."'" That reasoning seems impeccable, but the dissent
argued that Milwaukee & Mississippi Railroad v. Waukesha, an 1855 unre-
ported decision, ought to be followed.32 Mississippi Railroad tested the con-
stitutionality of a gross receipts tax on railroads, under which their property
was exempted from property taxes. The court held that uniformity within a
class is enough to satisfy constitutional standards. The decision in Knowl-
ton is attractive because of its congruence with the impulse behind the uni-
formity clause. By itself, however, that impulse is perhaps too simple for a
complex economy.
Mississippi Railroad introduced complexity into uniformity clause case
law by introducing pressure for economic development. The decision al-
lowed the creation of different kinds of taxes that would reflect new eco-
nomic realities and increasing revenue needs. On the other hand, the
decision allowed unwarranted flexibility by defining uniformity as to classes
of property, not as to all property. Thus, because any kind of differentiation
could be justified by concocting classes, the uniformity clause would be vir-
tually meaningless.
The court, after only two cases, was faced with diametrically opposed
precedents, which embodied vastly different conceptions of taxation. An
escape, however, was implicit in the court's statement in Mississippi Rail-
road that the gross receipts tax was a "bonus or compensation"' 33 or consid-
eration paid by the railroad for its property tax exemption, not a tax as that
term is used in the uniformity clause. Unfortunately, it took decades for the
court to realize that this statement would help resolve the dilemma.
The court made little progress in resolving the dilemma during the next
few years. In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Winnebago Lake & Fox River
Plankroad Co.,3' the court relied on Knowlton. The court, ignoring the hint
in Mississippi Railroad, decided that the gross receipts tax was subject to the
uniformity clause and that it classified property and applied different rates
to the classes.3 ' The dissenting judge, following Mississippi Railroad, ar-
gued that uniformity within a class is sufficient. In Weeks v. City of Mil-
31. Knowlton, 9 Wis. at 389.
32. A memorandum purporting to summarize the unreported case was appended to Knowl-
ton. See id. at 399-420.
33. Id. at 403.
34. 11 Wis. 34 (1860).
35. Id. at 40.
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waukee,36 decided in the same year, the court did not have to deal with the
uniformity clause's meaning; it held that the clause did not apply to special
assessments. In State ex rel Reedsburg Bank v. Hastings,37 the court ruled
that a tax on the capital stock of banks was not subject to the uniformity
clause. The statute authorizing that tax was not a product of the general
taxing power, but rather "a kind of legislative act of the people."'38 Uncon-
vincingly, the court based its reasoning on the assertion that the people had
reserved the right to legislate on banking because a referendum on whether
banking should be allowed in the state had been conducted. If that odd
distinction between popular and legislative enactments made sense, the tax
ought to have been invalidated because it was passed by the legislature, not
by popular referendum. In Slauson v. City of Racine,39 decided the next
year, the issue again was a limit on the property taxes imposed on agricul-
tural lands. The Slauson court followed Knowlton and invalidated the tax.
In summary, the case law was confusing in 1861.
In 1862, the confusion multiplied when another gross receipts case,
Kneeland v. City of Milwaukee,40 came before the court. The court fol-
lowed Knowlton and found nonuniformity in the omission of railroad prop-
erty from the tax rolls because of a special tax already applied to the
property.41 Realizing that, despite the philosophical attractiveness of
Knowlton, adherence to that precedent would invalidate taxes retroactively
for seven years, the court reheard and reversed Kneeland and overruled
Winnebago Lake & Fox River Plankroad Co. The court stated that its pur-
pose was to avoid financial chaos.
During the next two decades, the court decided several other uniformity
clause cases, but none raised disturbing issues. It took yet another railroad
case to do that. In Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Taylor County,42 at issue
was a property tax exemption granted to a railroad for ten years. The facts
presented the most pristine test of the Mississippi Railroad doctrine-that
uniformity within a class is sufficient-because the class in question had
only one member. The facts demonstrated the favors that the economically
powerful could elicit if taxes need not be uniform in any meaningful way.
The court approved the exemption, claiming that "[u]niformity of rule is
entirely different from uniformity of subjects to which the rule is applica-
36. 10 Wis. 186 (1860).
37. 12 Wis. 52 (1860).
38. Id. at 56.
39. 13 Wis. 444 (1861).
40. 15 Wis. 497 (1862).
41. Id. at 506-10.
42. 52 Wis. 37, 8 N.W. 833 (1881).
1993]
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ble."43 A better rationale perhaps would have been the legislature's power
to exempt property on the basis of the second part of article VIII, section 1.
The court also reaffirmed Mississippi Railroad, not merely in the limited
manner of the court in Kneeland, but on the merits. As a result, Mississippi
Railroad replaced Knowlton as the bedrock of uniformity clause case law.
During the next twenty-five years, the court again operated only around
the fringes of the uniformity clause, until it decided two more railroad
cases. In State v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,' a gross earnings tax
on railroads' income was at issue. The court followed Mississippi Railroad,
particularly the strategy of distinguishing between taxes to which the uni-
formity clause applied and taxes to which it did not apply. The court held
that the gross earnings tax "involves the contractual element, while taxation
in the ordinary sense ... [is] taxation on property, which is regulated by
sec. 1, art. VIII, of the constitution."45 Here, finally, was the solution to the
dilemma of Knowlton and Mississippi Railroad. The uniformity clause
could be made applicable, in a rigorous and literal way, to property taxes.
It could also be made inapplicable to other taxes and to situations in which
the same property may have been subject to two taxes. The court indicated
that uniformity within a class was not enough to satisfy the uniformity
clause; thus, arguments about the precedential value of various cases could
cease.
In the other railroad case of that same year, Chicago & Northwestern
Railway v. State,46 the court's task was made easier by the legislature, which
had changed the tax on railroads to an ad valorem tax. That change en-
couraged the court to return to the Knowlton line of cases, "[flor the direct
method [property taxation], the constitution puts all property chosen there-
for into one class, leaving all other property outside thereof, and contem-
plates one rule and, so far as practicable, one rate of taxation, as said in the
Kneeland case." 47 The court, however, not quite ready to be completely
rigorous and literal in applying the Knowlton rule, stated that "[laws as
regards [sic] mere details, designed to be aids in applying the rule, may or
may not violate it according as they reasonably are in furtherance of it or
are manifestly otherwise."48
Among the "details" that the court found to be outside the purview of
the uniformity clause were the assessment of franchises, the addition of
43. Id. at 94, 8 N.W. at 855.
44. 128 Wis. 449, 108 N.W. 594 (1906).
45. Id. at 484-85, 108 N.W. at 602.
46. 128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
47. Id. at 604, 108 N.W. at 567.
48. Id. at 613, 108 N.W. at 570.
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omitted property by the state board in determining the average rate to be
applied against the assessed value, the treatment of mortgages, and the use
of the prior year's rate. As to the assessment of franchises, the court (im-
probably, in light of assessors' testimony to the contrary) asserted that
franchises related to nonrailroad property must also have been valued. The
court's justifications for the other three differences were that the addition
was done in good faith, that railroad mortgages are different from other
mortgages, and that time constraints necessitated the practice. Thus,
although the court certainly overreached in order to validate certain assess-
ment practices, it also, together with its opinion in the companion case,
freed other taxes from the uniformity clause's restraints and applied that
clause to the property tax. After fifty-one years, the court was finally on a
somewhat steady course.
V. DETERMINING THE TAXES TO WHICH THE CLAUSE APPLIES
Although the railroad cases of 1906 brought order to uniformity clause
interpretation, they raised the issue of which taxes were subject to the
clause. The answer, that it applies only to property taxes, is implicit in
those cases, but it would take decades and dozens of cases before the court
solidly established that rule. As previously discussed, cases about gross re-
ceipts taxes first confused, but later clarified, the case law. Milwaukee &
Mississippi Railroad v. Board of Supervisors held that if the gross receipts
tax on railroads was subject to the uniformity clause, it complied with that
clause.49 In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Winnebago Lake & Fox River
Plankroad Co.,"0 the court decided that the uniformity clause applied to a
gross receipts tax. 1 In both the original trial and the rehearing of Knee-
land, the court applied the uniformity clause to a gross receipts tax. How-
ever, in State v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,52 the court decided that
the clause did not apply to gross receipts taxes.53 That court, it will be
recalled, distinguished taxes that have a "contractual element"54 from uni-
formity clause taxes.
In two cases from the Depression era, the court was almost faced with
deciding whether the uniformity clause applied to gross receipts taxes im-
posed on individuals. One of those taxes was the Emergency Unemploy-
49. This is Justice Cole's recollection of this unreported case, as cited in State ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. Winnebago Lake & Fox River Plankroad Co., 11 Wis. 34, 38 (1860).
50. 11 Wis. 34 (1860).
51. Id at 42-44.
52. 128 Wis. 449, 108 N.W. 594 (1906).
53. Id. at 484-85, 108 N.W. at 602.
54. Id at 546, 108 N.W. at 624.
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ment Relief Income Tax of 1932, which was litigated in Van Dyke v. Tax
Commission." The plaintiff claimed that the tax was a gross receipts tax,
not an income tax, and thus subject to the constitutional requirement of
uniformity, rather than the constitutional authorization of progressive in-
come taxes. The court, however, held that the provisions of the tax to which
the plaintiff objected did not apply to him. 6 A similar tax, the Emergency
Relief Tax of 1935, which was imposed on certain dividends, was at issue in
Welch v. Henry.57 The court held that, since the tax allowed deductions, it
was an income tax, and therefore the strict uniformity clause requirements
of article VIII, section 1 did not apply. 8
Almost ten percent of the uniformity clause cases involve special assess-
ments, despite the well-established rule that the clause is not applicable to
them. Such assessments are akin to property taxes because they are levied
against real property and are entered on property tax rolls.5 9 On the other
hand, the measure of a special assessment is the benefit to the property
rather than the property's value.' Assessments, therefore, resemble bills
for services rather than general revenue taxes. That important difference
suggests that special assessments should not be subject to the uniformity
clause. Nevertheless, the court in Weeks v. City of Milwaukee6 arrived at
the distinction between special assessments and property taxes by taking a
circuitous route. The court pointed to the home rule provisions of the state
constitution,62 which directed the legislature to restrict the power of cities
and villages to tax and assess,6 3 as evidence that the framers of the constitu-
tion intended a distinction in the uniformity clause between taxation and
assessment. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions to support its
position.
In another early case, Lumsden v. Cross," the court used the same rea-
soning as in Weeks and arrived at the same result. A few years later, in
Bond v. City ofKenosha,6" by merely stating that assessments were not sub-
55. 217 Wis. 528, 259 N.W. 700 (1935).
56. Id. at 546, 259 N.W. at 708.
57. 223 Wis. 319, 271 N.W. 68 (1937).
58. Id. at 328-29, 271 N.W. at 72-73. An appeal to the United States Supreme Court on
equal protection and due process grounds failed. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, reh'g denied,
305 U.S. 675 (1938). Previously, the plaintiff had unsuccessfully advanced an equal protection
argument to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Welch v. Henry, 226 Wis. 595, 277 N.W. 183 (1938).
59. Wis. STAT. § 70.66(4) (1991-92).
60. Wis. STAT. § 66.60(1) (1991-92).
61. 10 Wis. 186 (1860).
62. Id. at 203.
63. Id. at 195.
64. 10 Wis. 225 (1860).
65. 17 Wis. 292 (1863).
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ject to the uniformity clause, the court revealed its belief that the law on the
issue was settled. The Bond court cited Weeks, Lumsden, another Wiscon-
sin case that actually is not a uniformity clause case, and an Ohio case.6 6 In
three twentieth-century cases, 67 the court tersely refused to apply the uni-
formity clause to special assessments.
The court held firmly to its position on special assessments even after
the home rule provision of the state constitution was amended to delete the
distinction between assessments and taxes. The argument that the amend-
ment affected the status of special assessments for the uniformity clause was
made in City of Milwaukee v. Taylor.68 The court was unimpressed and
held that if special assessments were not taxes at the time of Weeks, they
were not taxes after the home rule provision was amended. 69 Thus, the
removal of a major basis for deciding the first special assessment case under
the uniformity clause did not cast doubt on the line of cases built on that
first case.
A second argument for holding that the uniformity clause does not ap-
ply to special assessments first appeared in Donnelly v. Decker.7" In that
case, the court held that assessments to fund construction of a drainage
ditch were made under the police power rather than under the taxing power
and thus were not subject to the uniformity clause.71 Although tracing a
governmental action back to a governmental power is somewhat artificial,
that approach does focus on the purpose and effects of special assessments.
A later special assessments case, Golden v. Green Bay Metropolitan Sewer-
age District,72 is tenuously related to Donnelly in that the court applied a
standard appropriate to a police power case: "The fact that some parcels
within those boundaries may not receive a direct benefit immediately does
not invalidate the project in the absence of abuse or purely arbitrary ac-
tion."73 The court considered that standard to be a uniformity clause stan-
dard. In Holt Lumber Co. v. City of Oconto,74 the court held that some
injustice is not enough to invalidate a special assessment on constitutional
66. Id at 296-98.
67. See Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 125 N.W.2d 617
(1964); Union Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 64, 108 N.W.2d 180 (1961); Lamasco
Realty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 8 N.W.2d 372 (1943).
68. 229 Wis. 328, 282 N.W. 448 (1938).
69. Id. at 340, 282 N.W. at 455.
70. 58 Wis. 461, 17 N.W. 389 (1883).
71. Id at 472, 17 N.W. at 393.
72. 210 Wis. 193, 246 N.W. 505 (1933).
73. Id. at 206, 246 N.W. at 510.
74. 145 Wis. 500, 130 N.W. 709 (1911).
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grounds. The standard resembles the one in Golden, but in Holt Lumber
Co. the court did not call it a uniformity clause standard.
Whatever the reason for believing that the uniformity clause does not
apply to special assessments, the belief became so well established that in
two fairly recent cases the court spent more time determining whether a
charge was a special assessment than making a uniformity clause analysis.
Special charges to pay the operating and maintenance costs of a sewerage
system and to retire revenue bonds issued to fund that system were litigated
in Williams v. City of Madison.75 The court, assuming that special assess-
ments were not required to be uniform, held that those charges were "not
technically a special assessment ' 76 because they were based in part on as-
sessed value. Although the court considered the charges to be "closely akin
in nature to [a special assessment], ' '7 7 the other bases of those charges and
the use of the revenue were enough to convince the court that the uniform-
ity clause did not apply to them.
City of Plymouth v. Eisner78 reached the opposite result, finding a
charge not to be a special assessment and invalidating it on uniformity
grounds. That charge was imposed on electrical service meters, was com-
puted at different rates for residential and commercial meters, and was in-
tended to raise revenue to purchase, lease, and maintain industrial sites.
According to the court, the absence of tangible benefits to individual pieces
of property distinguished the charge from special assessments.79 The court
did not deem it necessary to determine whether the charge was an excise tax
or a property tax. If it was the latter, it was invalid under the uniformity
clause because of the variation in rates.8 °
All uniformity clause cases involving the income tax arose after the
1908 amendment to article VIII, section 1, which authorized that tax.
Thus, it is unknown whether an income tax would have violated the origi-
nal version of that section. Probably only a flat rate tax with no deductions
would have been held to be uniform. The uniformity clause cases involving
the income tax not only make it clear that income taxes need not be uni-
form, but also further define some of the terms used in the 1908 amendment
to aid in the determination of whether that amendment authorized the tax
in question.
75. 15 Wis. 2d 430, 113 N.W.2d 395 (1962).
76. Id. at 443, 113 N.W.2d at 402.
77. Id.
78. 28 Wis. 2d 102, 135 N.W.2d 799 (1965).
79. Id. at 108-09, 135 N.W.2d at 803.
80. Id. at 105, 135 N.W.2d at 801-02.
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The first cases testing the constitutionality of the income tax were the
Income Tax Cases. 1 The courts held that the 1908 amendment and the
enactment of the income tax statutes had fulfilled the legislature's intent:
By this act the legislature has, in substance, declared that the state's
system of taxation shall be changed from a system of uniform taxa-
tion of property... to a system which shall be a combination of two
ideas, namely, taxation of persons progressively, according to ability
to pay, and taxation of real property uniformly, according to value.8 2
The court tested income tax classifications by determining whether there
was a "substantial difference of situation." 3 In Hoeper v. Wisconsin Tax
Commission, 4 a later court adopted that test. Another income tax case,
State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission,"5 concerned
a tax on "income ... derived from sources within the state or within its
jurisdiction,"8 6 under which a tax had been imposed on nonresident holders
of the plaintiff's bonds. The court, following the Income Tax Cases, held
that strict uniformity of the kind required by the original version of article
VIII, section 1 does not apply to the income tax.8 7 The court also genera-
lized "that part of property constituting income shall be separately and dif-
ferently taxed from all other property."88
A few years later, State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 9 a case concerning
both a property tax and an income tax, came before the court. This case
offered the court a chance to further distinguish between those taxes. Un-
fortunately, the court equivocated. The issue involved a combination of a
tax on property and an income surtax that was devised to pay bonuses to
World War I veterans. The property tax component was found to be uni-
form.9" The court logically held that the uniformity clause "has no applica-
tion to income tax,"91 but it also needlessly muddied the waters by making
a uniformity clause analysis that harkened back to Milwaukee & Mississippi
81. 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673, 135 N.W. 164 (1912). The cases were dismissed in Bolens v.
Frear, 231 U.S. 616 (1914).
82. 148 Wis. at 506, 134 N.W.2d at 688-89.
83. Id at 513, 134 N.W. at 691.
84. 202 Wis. 493, 233 N.W. 100 (1930). This case, which involved a combination of house-
hold income, was reversed on due process and equal protection grounds. See Hoeper v. Tax
Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
85. 161 Wis. 111, 152 N.W. 848 (1915).
86. WIs. STAT. § 1087(m-2) (1911).
87. Manitowoc Gas Co., 161 Wis. at 114, 152 N.W. at 850.
88. Id. at 116, 152 N.W. at 850.
89. 170 Wis. 218, 175 N.W. 589 (1919).
90. Id. at 241, 175 N.W. at 598.
91. Id. at 242, 175 N.W. at 599.
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Railroad v. Board of Supervisors.92 That is, the court claimed that uniform-
ity within a class was enough.93 This discredited means of indirectly mak-
ing the uniformity clause inapplicable to a tax would have been best left
unexhumed.
In addition to deciding whether the income tax must be strictly uni-
form, the court has had to define "income" as it is used in the uniformity
clause. The first case that did so was Van Dyke v. City of Milwaukee,94
which concerned the income taxation of dividends. The plaintiff argued
that part of the money paid as dividends is a return of capital, so that taxa-
tion of dividends goes beyond the constitutional authorization of a tax on
income. The court interpreted income "in its common, ordinary meaning,
and not in its strict, technical, or true economic sense." 95 The court did not
specify that term's ordinary meaning, but implied that it was broad. A few
years later, the court found that taxing dividends was constitutional.96 In
State ex reL Dulaney v Nygaard,97 the third dividend case, the court made
explicit that which was implicit in Van Dyke, stating that the uniformity
clause "subjects to taxation 'incomes' without limitation.' 98 A more spe-
cific definition of income, "profit or gain derived from capital or labor or
both combined," appeared in two other early cases. 99 In a fourth dividend
case, Marine National Exchange Bank v. Department of Taxation,1°" the
court assumed that including dividends in income for tax purposes did not
violate the uniformity clause,1°1 and it then addressed the issue of whether
the dividends were constructively received. Although taxpayers can co-
gently argue that a tax on dividends is not a tax on income, the court has
always found that tax to be authorized by article VIII, section 1. The
court's apparent determination to find that the uniformity clause authorizes
an income tax on any kind of gain has probably been a major reason why
the meaning of "income" in that clause has not been litigated in the state
supreme court for decades.
92. See Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 378, 399-420 (1859), for a memorandum
purporting to summarize this opinion.
93. Atwood, 170 Wis. at 242, 175 N.W. at 598-99.
94. 159 Wis. 460, 146 N.W. 812 (1915). The case was upheld on rehearing on other grounds.
See Van Dyke v. City of Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 468, 469-70, 150 N.W. 509, 510 (1915).
95. Id. at 464, 146 N.W. at 813.
96. State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 161 Wis. 111, 152 N.W. 848
(1915).
97. 174 Wis. 597, 183 N.W. 884 (1921).
98. Id. at 607, 183 N.W. at 887.
99. See State ex rel. Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Widule, 164 Wis. 56, 61, 159 N.W. 630, 632
(1916); State ex rel. Bundy v. Nygaard, 163 Wis. 307, 310, 158 N.W. 87, 88 (1916).
100. 12 Wis. 2d 154, 107 N.W.2d 157 (1961).
101. Id. at 157, 107 N.W.2d at 158.
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"Reasonable exemptions" is another term added by the 1908 amend-
ment that has been an issue in litigation. State ex rel. Warren v. Nus-
baum "2 addressed an income tax exemption10 3 for income earned on notes
and bonds issued by the Wisconsin Housing Finance Authority."° The
court found that the Authority was engaged in "essential public functions"
and, thus, exempting its financial instruments was reasonable under the uni-
formity clause.105 Like the equal protection standard, the reasonableness
standard is not difficult to meet. The court's search for a public purpose in
Nusbaum also resembles the analysis of police power cases. However rea-
sonableness is defined, challenging income tax exemptions under the uni-
formity clause does not appear to be a promising endeavor. Potential
litigants seem to have realized that success is unlikely because Nusbaum is
the only case on that issue. In short, the 1908 amendment appears to have
accomplished its purpose. It removed all uniformity clause impediments to
the legislature's efforts to construct whatever type of income tax it wished.
The other tax that has often been litigated on uniformity clause grounds
is the inheritance tax. The first case of that type, Black v. State,106 set a
rational course for the others. The court called the tax a privilege tax and
therefore found that it is not bound by the constitutional requirement of
absolute uniformity. Thus, relevant classifications may be made and ex-
emptions granted, if both are reasonable.10 7 However, the tax failed to pass
constitutional muster on equal protection grounds. It granted a $10,000 ex-
emption to each estate so that persons who inherited the same amount from
different estates would pay different amounts of tax.108 After the legislature
responded to Black by changing the exemption,10 9 the inheritance tax was
assailed again in Nunnemacher v. State.110 Again the court applied only a
reasonableness standard, 1 not an absolute uniformity standard, to the tax
and held for the state. The constitutional amendment that authorized privi-
lege taxes adopted the reasonableness standard used in Black and
Nunnemacher.
102. 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973).
103. See Wis. STAT. § 234.28 (1991-92).
104. The Wisconsin Housing Finance Authority is now called the Wisconsin Housing and
Economic Development Authority. See Wis. STAT. § 234.01(1) (1991-92).
105. Warren, 59 Wis. 2d at 439, 208 N.W.2d at 808.
106. 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. 522 (1902).
107. Id at 222, 89 N.W. at 528.
108. Id
109. See 1903 Wis. Laws ch. 44, § 4.
110. 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
111. Id at 221, 108 N.W. at 637.
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In Beals v. State,1 12 the plaintiff cited dicta in Nunnemacher which
stated that the rights to devise and inherit are natural rights. The plaintiff
argued that these natural rights are property rights and that taxes imposed
on them must be strictly uniform under article VIII, section 1.113 The court
disagreed and simply followed Nunnemacher. In State v. Pabst, 4 the court
upheld the inheritance tax, citing both Nunnemacher and Beals. Will of
Harnischfeger v. Harnischfeger1I 5 concerned a statute that included the
value of gifts made within two years of death in the value of property sub-
ject to the inheritance tax. In a motion for rehearing it was argued that the
provision, in effect, imposed a graduated tax on gifts contrary to the uni-
formity clause. That argument allowed the court to decide whether the
uniformity clause applied to the gift tax. However, the court declined the
gambit and denied the motion without argument. The gift tax's status
under the uniformity clause has not been decided, but the chances are that,
like the inheritance tax, the gift tax would not have been held subject to
strict uniformity. No one will ever know, however, because, like the inheri-
tance tax, the gift tax has been discontinued. In Will ofLeFeber v. State,'1 6
a special inheritance tax, a provision devised to generate funds that could be
used to relieve victims of the Depression, was at issue. LeFeber was decided
as an equal protection case (the tax was found to violate it); the court as-
sumed that the uniformity clause did not apply to the special inheritance
tax.
Throughout this sequence of inheritance tax cases, the court ruled con-
sistently. However, the most recent case, Estate of Heuel v. State,"7 was
inconsistent with past cases. The opinion began by adhering to Beals and
asserting that the uniformity clause in the strict sense did not apply to the
inheritance tax. Then the court asserted that, for the inheritance tax, the
uniformity clause "means simply taxation which acts alike on all persons
similarly situated."' 1 8 Thus, the court took the same false steps that were
taken in State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson:"9 the failure to explicitly state
that strict uniformity does not apply to a tax and the failure to then turn the
case into an equal protection case. Despite this development, strict uni-
formity is clearly not a requirement for the inheritance tax.
112. 139 Wis. 544, 121 N.W. 347 (1909).
113. Id. at 555, 121 N.W. at 349.
114. 139 Wis. 561, 121 N.W. 351 (1909).
115. 208 Wis. 317, 242 N.W. 153, rehg denied, 208 Wis. 331, 243 N.W. 453, and cert. dis-
missed, 287 U.S. 567 (1932) (lack of a substantial federal question).
116. 223 Wis. 393, 271 N.W. 95 (1937).
117. 4 Wis. 2d 400, 90 N.W.2d 634 (1958).
118. Id. at 404, 90 N.W.2d at 637 (citation omitted).
119. 170 Wis. 218, 175 N.W. 589 (1919).
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Litigants have challenged a large number of other exactions on uniform-
ity clause grounds. Two of those exactions resemble property taxes and
help establish the boundary between the exactions subject to the clause and
those not subject to it. One, the parking permit fee levied on mobile
homes,12 is imposed in lieu of property taxes.- The court noted that the fee
was for parking because it was not assessed on vacant mobile homes, those
held for sale, or those used only for trips. Therefore, the court considered
the fee an excise tax, not a property tax, and thus not subject to strict uni-
formity. Similarly, in City of Plymouth v. Elsner,'2' the court did not decide
whether a tax levied on electrical meters was an excise tax or a property tax.
However, it did hold that if the tax was a property tax, it violated the uni-
formity clause because different rates were applied to residential meters
than to commercial meters. 122 The court found other grounds for overturn-
ing the tax if it was considered an excise tax.
Two taxes that resemble income taxes have also been challenged on uni-
formity clause grounds. The first, a capital stock tax, also resembles a prop-
erty tax in that it is calculated on the basis of value without any deductions.
Thus, these types of taxes offered the court another chance to draw a clear
boundary between uniformity clause taxes and other taxes. Unfortunately,
the capital stock case is State ex rel. Reedsburg Bank v. Hastings,123 where
the court reasoned that banking is a subject of legislation reserved to the
people; therefore, a bank tax need not be uniform. Seven years later, Van
Dyke v. State 124 confronted a slightly different tax: one imposed on bank
shares. 12 The court decided that a federal statute authorizing states to tax
the shares of national banks would validate this tax on uniformity clause
grounds. Thus, the court did not apply a uniformity clause analysis. These
two cases do not clearly indicate whether taxes that have some property tax
characteristics are subject to the uniformity clause. Nevertheless, despite
the lack of an explicit holding on the subject, one may safely conclude from
the court's predilection for limiting the taxes to which the clause applies
that it will not expand the clause's scope to include taxes of this type.
Premium taxes, which have little in common with the property tax and
more in common with the income tax, have been litigated several times. In
120. 'Wis. STAT. § 66.058(3) (1991-92); see also Barnes v. City of West Allis, 275 Wis. 31, 81
N.W.2d 75 (1957).
121. 28 Wis. 2d 102, 135 N.W.2d 799 (1965).
122. Id at 106, 135 N.W.2d at 801-02.
123. 12 Wis. 52 (1860).
124. 23 Wis. 655 (1869), aff'd, 154 U.S. 581 (1871).
125. Ia at 656.
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one of these cases, Fire Department v. Helfenstein,126 the court sounded for
the first time a theme that, as we have seen, has occasionally appeared in
the case law: alluding to the police power to identify taxes that are free of
the bonds of the uniformity clause. 127 Specifically, the court held that the
state may decide whether a business will be allowed to operate and, if the
state allows operation, it may impose a tax that would not be subject to
strict uniformity. 128 One difficulty with this analysis is that it is too broad.
This type of analysis could be used to make the uniformity clause inapplica-
ble to the property tax on businesses, a result that would throw the uni-
formity clause case law into chaos. Moreover, the tax in this case appears
to be designed to raise general revenue, not to fund an administrative sys-
tem available to the taxpayer. It is a tax, not a license fee subject to the
police power. The police power would have been more relevant to a pre-
mium tax if the proceeds had been used, as some of them are now, to pro-
vide funds for volunteer fire departments and thus promote health and
safety. 129
In Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Fricke,130 the court adhered to the prece-
dent in Helfenstein, distinguishing between a premium tax and the appar-
ently similar gross receipts tax on railroads because the latter was imposed
on an "inherently lawful business."'' This unconvincing argument indi-
cates the flaw in the reasoning of the earlier case and the difficulty the court
had during the nineteenth century in understanding the uniformity clause
and its purpose. The 1908 amendment to article VIII, section 1, which
authorizes not only income taxes but also taxes on "privileges and occupa-
tions," made it much easier for the court to analyze premium taxes. Also,
the only other insurance company case, Northwestern Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. State, 3 2 brought on uniformity clause grounds, involved a li-
cense fee, which is more obviously a privilege tax.
Taxes that are imposed in return for the right to conduct business have
also been alleged to violate the uniformity clause. In State v. Whitcom,'3 3
the only case on point decided before the 1908 amendment, a peddler's li-
cense was at issue. The court asserted that there was a boundary between
uniformity clause taxes and police power taxes, but declined to place this
126. 16 Wis. 142 (1862).
127. Id. at 145.
128. Id.
129. See Wis. STAT. § 101.573 (1991-92).
130. 99 Wis. 367, 74 N.W. 372 (1898).
131. Id. at 374, 74 N.W. at 374.
132. 163 Wis. 484, 155 N.W. 609, 158 N.W. 328 (1916), aff'd, 247 U.S. 132 (1918).
133. 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468 (1904).
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license fee on either side of the boundary. Its reason for declining to do so
cast doubt on that distinction's validity; the court claimed that the same
analysis applies to both kinds of tax. The court's analysis more closely re-
sembled an equal protection analysis. The court decided that the classifica-
tion was unreasonable because there were many exemptions and the fee was
based on the peddler's means of locomotion. Whitcom illustrates the diffi-
culty the court had in deciding the constitutional status of occupational
taxes. The uniformity clause, therefore, loomed as a barrier to rational tax
policy. The year after Whitcom, probably not by coincidence, the legisla-
ture passed on first consideration the amendment that authorized taxes on
privileges and occupations.
After that amendment, occupational tax and privilege tax cases became
easier to decide. The court had little trouble even with a case that came
before it in an unusual posture. The Milwaukee Tax Commissioner argued
in State ex rel. Bernhard Stern & Sons v. Bodden134 that an occupational tax
on grain elevators violated the uniformity clause. The commissioner as-
serted that, because an elevator operator paid an occupational tax, it was
nonuniform to exempt from the property tax grain owned by the operator.
The Commissioner's motive was to expand the city's tax base. Oddly, a tax
collector, not a taxpayer, invoked the uniformity clause. The court looked
to the material added by the 1908 amendment to article VIII, section 1 to
justify the occupational tax. It also looked to the original version of that
section to justify the property tax exemption, which it found to be reason-
able. In a later case, the court found that the same principles that applied
to the occupational tax on handling grain in Stern applied to the occupa-
tional tax on handling coal.1 35 These two cases demonstrate that the 1908
amendment does the same thing for occupational taxes that it does for the
income tax: make it unnecessary for them to be strictly uniform.
As another case indicates, the same is true of taxes on privileges. State
ex rel. Froedert Grain & Malting Co. v. Tax Commission 136 involved a tax
on declaring and receiving corporate dividends. The court approved the tax
because it was a privilege tax authorized by article VIII, section 1.137 How-
ever, during the next year the court decided that a tax imposed on receiving
certain dividends (the emergency relief tax of 1935) was an income tax, not
a privilege tax.1 31 The plaintiff argued that the tax was not an income tax
because it was not levied on all income, but the court responded that that
134. 165 Wis. 75, 160 N.W. 1077 (1917).
135. State ex re Consolidation Coal Co. v. Arnold, 186 Wis. 609, 203 N.W. 373 (1925).
136. 221 Wis. 225, 265 N.W. 672 (1936).
137. Id. at 232, 265 N.W. at 675.
138. Welch v. Henry, 223 Wis. 319, 328, 271 N.W. 68, 72-73 (1937).
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principle would make it impossible to levy an income tax, since an income
tax necessarily exempts some income.'39 Despite the scarcity of relevant
case law, the court in Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee 140 included among its
list of rules gleaned from uniformity clause litigation the maxim that
"[p]rivilege taxes are not direct taxes on property and are not subject to the
uniformity rule."''
The court resolved a recent case by declaring that a certain tax was a
privilege tax and thus not subject to the constitutional requirements that
apply to income tax. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ley,'42 the taxpayer argued that
the uniformity clause ought to apply to the franchise tax, which virtually all
corporations pay instead of the income tax and which differs from the in-
come tax mainly in that earnings from federal obligations are subject to it.
The court rejected the argument that the franchise tax was really an income
tax, pointing out that the franchise tax was measured by, not imposed on,
income.
The court has consistently differentiated between fees and uniformity
clause taxes. One example is a fee paid to a register of deeds.143 In Wad-
hams Oil Co. v. Tracy,'" the court held that a fee imposed for the inspec-
tion of petroleum products was not a tax but an exaction under the police
power. 45 That power appeared to be appropriate because protection of
health and safety was the motive for the inspection. In addition, the fees
seemed merely to cover the administrative costs of the inspection rather
than to accumulate revenue for general use. Using a police power analysis,
rather than simply distinguishing fees from taxes, introduces confusion be-
cause it requires an analysis of purpose and of governmental powers.
A more recent fee case introduced another source of confusion. Jordan
v. Village of Menomonee Falls 46 involved a fee for obtaining approval of a
plat. The court held that if the charge was a tax, it was an excise tax and
thus not subject to the uniformity clause. 4 7 That approach suggests that
some fees may be taxes to which the uniformity clause applies. However, a
simple distinction between fees and taxes would probably have established a
more useful precedent.
139. Id.
140. 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
141. Id. at 424, 147 N.W.2d at 641.
142. 142 Wis. 2d 108, 416 N.W.2d 680 (Ct. App. 1987).
143. See Verges v. Milwaukee County, 116 Wis. 191, 93 N.W. 44 (1903).
144. 141 Wis. 150, 123 N.W. 785 (1909).
145. Id. at 158-59, 123 N.W. at 788-89.
146. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, cert. dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1965) (lack of federal
question).
147. Id. at 622, 137 N.W.2d at 450.
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There is even one sales tax case, Ramrod Insurance v. Department of
Revenue, 148 in which the uniformity clause was an issue. The court held
that it was a privilege tax and thus not required to be strictly uniform.' 49
At issue was the exemption of occasional sales by persons who do not hold
a seller's permit and the taxation of those sales by persons who do hold a
seller's permit.'5 0 The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that the difference in-
volved nonuniformity.
In two cases taxpayers argued that the interaction of two taxes created
nonuniformity. One is State ex rel. Bernhard Stern & Sons v. Bodden,'5 '
which found constitutional on uniformity grounds property taxation of
grain that depended on whether the owner was subject to an occupational
tax for handling it. In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 5 2 an argument was made that imposition of the income tax and the
estate tax on the proceeds from the sale of a partnership interest was
nonuniform. Rather than simply observing that neither tax is required to
be strictly uniform, the court noted that two taxable events occurred, justi-
fying two taxes.15 3 One can plausibly conclude that the interaction of any
two taxes, unless one of them is the property tax, would not violate the
uniformity clause. The outcome of a case involving interaction of the prop-
erty tax and another tax is somewhat more difficult to predict. Neverthe-
less, the point made in American Bank & Trust about the two taxable events
would probably be relevant; thus, uniformity would be tested only in regard
to the property tax.
Because many taxes have come under judicial scrutiny on uniformity
clause grounds, it is useful to distinguish taxes to which strict uniformity
applies from other taxes. As we have seen, the contrast between police
power exactions and uniformity clause taxes appeared in cases such as
Wadhams. However, the usefulness of that contrast is limited because it
leads to another fairly difficult inquiry: whether the exaction was imposed
under the police power. In- State ex rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 54 the court
cited a statement in the homestead credit law that the law was "enacted
under the police power of the state."' 5 This statement provided a rationale
for holding that the rule of uniformity did not apply to the credit. A sim-
148. 64 Wis. 2d 499, 219 N.W.2d 604 (1974).
149. Id. at 502, 219 N.W.2d at 606.
150. Wis. STAT. § 77.51(9)(a) (1991-92).
151. 165 Wis. 75, 160 N.W. 1077 (1917).
152. 60 Wis. 2d 660, 211 N.W.2d 627 (1973).
153. Id. at 666, 211 N.W.2d at 630.
154. 30 Wis. 2d 1, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966).
155. Id at 13, 139 N.W.2d at 591.
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pler generalization, that "[t]he rule of taxation shall be uniform,"'1 6 applies
only to the property tax. Other taxes are subject to other requirements
stated in article VIII, section 1 and in the case law interpreting that section.
Because the property tax supplied the largest portion of governmental reve-
nue in 1848, the framers of the state constitution probably did not contem-
plate applying that requirement to other state taxes. Taxes based on ability
to pay, taxes directly related to a discrete service, taxes designed in part to
redistribute wealth, or taxes designed to encourage or discourage certain
activities cannot fulfill their functions if those taxes must be strictly
uniform.
VI. ISSUES IN THE PROPERTY TAX PROCESS
The uniformity clause obviously applies to the property tax; however,
the property tax is not a simple entity. Rather, it is a complicated adminis-
trative process performed by various government officials. Hence, many
issues have been raised in uniformity clause cases about the property tax. It
is useful to analyze those issues in the order in which they arise in the prop-
erty tax process.
Perhaps the earliest step in the property tax process that has been con-
sidered by the court is the selection of assessors, which was among the is-
sues in State ex rel. Milwaukee Street Railway v. Anderson.'57 The court
held that those differences did not violate the uniformity clause. 5
In Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Lincoln County, 159 the central issue
was the time of the assessment. When that case was decided, the deadlines
for assessing real and personal property were different. The time of the
assessment was crucial to the railroad because its ten-year exemption from
property taxes expired before one of the assessment dates. The court con-
sidered the difference to be a mere detail, not a constitutional infirmity.
That result makes sense because all of the taxable property in a taxation
district cannot be valued on the same day, even though it is required by
statute to be valued as of the same day, January 1.160 Timing of assess-
ments is also a problem if an improvement to real property is accidentally
destroyed on any day other than January 1 so that for part of the year the
actual value of the taxpayer's property is less than its assessed value. De-
spite the equitable arguments that a taxpayer could make in this situation,
156. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1974).
157. 90 Wis. 550, 63 N.W. 746 (1895).
158. Id. at 568-69, 63 N.W. at 751.
159. 57 Wis. 137, 15 N.W. 121 (1883).
160. Wis. STAT. § 70.10 (1991-92).
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granting relief by lowering the assessment would probably create an uncon-
stitutional partial exemption.
The second part of the first sentence of article VIII, section 1 in its
original version (and the beginning of the second sentence of that section
after the 1941 amendment) allows the legislature to designate taxable prop-
erty. The issue of taxability arose in Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light
Co. v. Tax Commission161 and two companion cases.1 62 In the principal
case, the plaintiff argued that taxing its motor vehicles under the utility tax
and exempting them under the property tax was nonuniform. The court
responded that the uniformity clause "does not require uniformity as to the
subjects of taxation." 163 A more logical response would have simply cited
the legislature's constitutional authority to bestow property tax exemptions.
The court has consistently held that property may not be partially ex-
empted. The first reported uniformity clause case, Knowlton v. Board of
Supervisors,161 involved a limit on the taxes on agricultural land and created
a partial exemption. The court stated, "There cannot be any medium
ground between absolute exemption and uniform taxation." 65 Although
both total exemption and partial exemption are nonuniform compared to
taxation at full value, the former is explicitly authorized by article VIII,
section 1. One of the few cases on partial exemption is among the handful
of the more important uniformity clause cases. Gottlieb v. City of Milwau-
kee 166 is a declaratory judgment case that tested the constitutionality of the
Urban Redevelopment Law,167 which authorized certain municipalities to
freeze the assessments on property in certain areas. The court reached back
more than 100 years to Knowlton for a precedent and found the assessment
freeze to be an unconstitutional partial exemption.
Courts have also been unreceptive to partial exemptions achieved indi-
rectly. Ehrlich v. City of Racine 168 was a case brought by the city in hopes
of nullifying an agreement to refund property taxes in excess of $500 per
acre for ten years in return for Ehrlich allowing a storm sewer to be built on
his land. The court found this limit on taxes to be an unconstitutional par-
tial exemption.1 69 A similar case is State ex reL La Follette v. Torphy.1 70 A
161. 207 Wis. 523, 242 N.W. 313 (1932).
162. Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co. v. Tax Con'n, 207 Wis. 546, 242 N.W. 321 (1932); Wis-
consin-Michigan Power Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 207 Wis. 547, 242 N.W. 352 (1932).
163. Milwaukee Elea Ry., 207 Wis. at 537, 242 N.W. at 318.
164. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
165. Id. at 392.
166. 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
167. Wis. STAT. §§ 66.405-.425 (1991-92).
168. 26 Wis. 2d 352, 132 N.W.2d 489 (1965).
169. Id. at 356, 132 N.W.2d at 491.
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declaratory judgment action tested the Improvements Tax Relief Law, 171
which was designed to alleviate the frustration experienced by persons who
have improved their property only to incur more costs because they have
added to the property's assessed value. This Act gave an income tax credit
for home and garage improvements that increased assessments. The court,
as it did in Ehrlich, looked beyond the form of the credit to the resulting
partial exemption and declared it unconstitutional. 172
The prohibition against partial exemptions is less important in relation
to individual pieces of property than it is in relation to economic incentives
and tax relief programs such as those at issue in Gottlieb and La Follette.
As a consequence, the prohibition against partial exemptions is most signifi-
cant as a restraint on the legislature. In fact, the Attorney General, re-
sponding to inquiries from the legislature, has opined nine times that
proposed legislation would create an unconstitutional partial exemption.
Those opinions discussed limiting term exemption for new buildings, 173 re-
ducing property taxes on liquor equal to the amount of excise taxes paid on
it, 74 assessing personal property by means of the average monthly inven-
tory method, 75 assessing urban agricultural land according to present use
rather than according to highest and best use,176 exempting the first $3750
of the assessed value of homesteads,1 77 assessing as unimproved all land
that as of May 1 is the site of a building that has never been occupied,
178
temporarily excluding the value of improvements to land in a conservation
area, 179 assessing land according to its value,' 80 and limiting the assessed
value of agricultural land. 8 The conclusion of each opinion was probably
correct. Some of the proposed legislation scrutinized in those opinions is
perhaps good public policy, but the uniformity clause inhibits the legisla-
ture from effecting it. This is not to say that the clause ought to be removed
from the state constitution; one could also compile a list of possible horrors
that it precludes.
170. 85 Wis. 2d 94, 270 N.W.2d 187 (1978).
171. Wis. STAT. §§ 79.24-.25 (1991-92).
172. La Follette, 85 Wis. 2d at 111-12, 270 N.W.2d at 194.
173. 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 265 (1931).
174. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 276 (1949).
175. 46 Op. Att'y Gen. 156 (1957).
176. 52 Op. Att'y Gen. 170 (1963).
177. 52 Op. Att'y Gen. 143 (1963).
178. 52 Op. Att'y Gen. 180 (1963).
179. 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 326 (1977).
180. 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 76 (1979).
181. 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 179 (1979).
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The situs of property for property tax purposes is important because the
rates that are multiplied by the valuation to obtain the tax vary among
jurisdictions. The situs of millions of feet of saw logs was litigated in State
ex rel. Holt Lumber Co. v. Bellew.'82 A statute provided that the situs of
saw logs is their location unless the owner files an affidavit stating that he or
she will process them. The court did not find a uniformity clause problem
with the statute, because all of the property in the class was treated uni-
formly.183 The difficulty with that reasoning, however, is the Milwaukee &
Mississippi Railroad v. Board of Supervisors'84 decision, which approved
classification into very small units so that uniformity is attenuated. Unfor-
tunately, factual complications, such as property in transit, make it impossi-
ble to have a single rational rule of situs for all property. In fact, fairly
elaborate rules about the situs of saw logs are still in the statutes. 185 Al-
lowing some classification as to situs, as in Holt Lumber, may be the only
acceptable alternative.
Oddly enough, assessment of property as a unit has been an issue in
several uniformity clause cases. The first of them'86 was also in a sense a
situs case. In the case, a railroad company challenged the assessment of all
its property by the taxation district that contained its principal office,
whereas property owned by other kinds of taxpayers was assessed by the
district where the property was located. The court asserted that it was nec-
essary to assess the company's property as a unit in order to value it accu-
rately. Today, assessment of railroad property as a unit is required, and its
situs is deemed to be the state capitol 187 because the state, not local units of
government, tax that property. However, when two taxes are involved, the
principle of unit assessment can have a less defensible result. In another
railroad case, 18 8 a statute exempting docks and certain land from the rail-
road tax, thereby subjecting it to the property tax, was challenged. Again
the court approved unit assessment of the railroad's property, but con-
cluded that the interaction of the two taxes resulted in assessing the same
property at different rates, thus violating the uniformity clause. 189 How-
ever, the legislature remedied the defects in the statutes that the court noted
182. 86 Wis. 189, 56 N.W. 782 (1893).
183. Id. at 195, 56 N.W. at 784.
184. For a memorandum purporting to summarize this unreported case, see Knowlton v.
Board of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 378, 399-420 (1859).
185. See Wis. STAT. § 70.13(2), (7) (1991-92).
186. State ex rel. Milwaukee St. Ry. v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550, 63 N.W. 746 (1895).
187. Wis. STAT. § 76.03(3) (1991-92).
188. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Douglas County, 159 Wis. 408, 150 N.W. 422
(1915).
189. Id. at 413, 150 N.W. at 423.
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in that case, and the next year in State ex rel. City of Superior v. Donald, 190
a case that had similar facts, the court approved the new taxation scheme.
Thus, courts have consistently been willing to consider unit assessment as a
uniformity clause issue, but it is not clear what kinds of factual situations
will be found unconstitutional.
The method of evaluation has also been an issue in litigation, although
not as often as one might think. In some cases, the court has been flexible
and has allowed different methods. For example, in a case involving the
difference between "full value" (the statutory standard for valuation of real
property) and "true cash value" (the statutory standard for valuation of
personal property), the court held that the uniformity clause is not violated
if different terms describe "substantially the same method of valuation."''
The court was even more flexible in State v. Pullman Co.,192 in which it did
not find a violation of the uniformity clause even though the taxpayer's
sleeping cars were valued differently than other property it owned and dif-
ferently than sleeping cars owned by other railroads. In Flood v. Village of
Lomira,193 the court approved a cash equivalency adjustment to an assess-
ment. Thus, an assessor could determine the value of property that was
recently purchased and financed by the seller by adjusting the sales price to
reflect the difference between the financing terms and the normal financing
terms.
On the other hand, the use by assessors of methods sufficiently different
will cause the court to find a violation of the uniformity clause. In State ex
rel. Boostrom v. Board of Review, 194 the taxpayer objected to an assessment
in which the valuation of all agricultural land was increased by forty per-
cent, whereas other kinds of property were individually assessed. The court
considered the effect "substantial enough to result in an unequal burden of
property taxation in violation of the uniformity clause."' 195 In State ex rel.
Baker Manufacturing Co. v. City of Evansville,196 the court held that the
190. 163 Wis. 626, 158 N.W. 317 (1916).
191. Town of Menominee v. Skubitz, 53 Wis. 2d 430, 439, 192 N.W.2d 887, 891 (1972).
192. 178 Wis. 240, 189 N.W. 543 (1922).
193. 149 Wis. 2d 220, 440 N.W.2d 575 (1989).
194. 42 Wis. 2d 149, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969).
195. Id. at 160, 166 N.W.2d at 190. An assessment ratio is the percentage of fair market
value at which a taxation district assesses. It is calculated by the Department of Revenue under
Wisconsin Statutes section 70.575 (1991-92) for the state forestation tax, although it is also used in
calculating aid payments such as shared revenue and school aids. The Department makes its own
assessment of a sample of property in a district and then compares the district's assessments of
that property. Although Wisconsin Statutes section 70.32 (1991-92) requires assessment at fair
market value, many taxation districts do not comply. Wisconsin Statutes section 70.05 is designed
to improve compliance.
196. 261 Wis. 599, 53 N.W.2d 795 (1952).
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difference between the assessment ratio (the ratio of assessed value to actual
value) for the plaintiff's personal property and the ratio for its real property
violated the uniformity clause.
One of the more bizarre cases in which an assessment was challenged on
the basis of the uniformity clause is State v. Board of Review.19 7 Rather
than comparing the challenged assessment to the requirements of the uni-
formity clause, the court gave great weight to statistics that the assessor
furnished. The coefficient of dispersion of a number of that assessor's valu-
ations were within the range that the Department of Revenue considered
satisfactory. The court seemed to conclude from those statistics that the
assessor was assessing uniformly. Thus, the taxpayer had not proved a con-
stitutional violation.
Unfortunately, there is an inconsistent case on the issue of assessment
methods. In State ex rel. Hensel v. Town of Wilson, the court held that
"[u]nder the rule of uniformity, the appellant should be allowed, as here, to
demonstrate that, despite the fact that he has paid a fair price for the prop-
erty, the assessments of comparable property were significantly lower."19
The court alluded to the two most common methods of determining fair
market value: using the price paid in a recent arm's-length sale as the basis
and comparing the property to similar properties ("comparables") that
have been valued. The court chose an appropriate precedent, State ex reL
Enterprise Realty Co. v. Swiderski,199 which held that if there has been a
recent arm's-length sale, the sale price must be the basis of the assessed
value. The court used the case instead, however, to argue that, despite a
recent sale, comparables should be considered.2" Seven other cases, two
before Hensel and five after it, have the same holding as Enterprise
Realty.20 1
The burden of proof borne by a taxpayer in attacking an assessment on
uniformity grounds is considerable, as State ex rel. Fort Howard Paper Co.
197. 164 Wis. 2d 31, 473 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1991).
198. 55 Wis. 2d 101, 197 N.W.2d 794 (1972).
199. 269 Wis. 642, 70 N.W.2d 34 (1955).
200. Hensel, 55 Wis. 2d at 105, 197 N.W.2d at 796.
201. See Darcel v. City of Manitowoc Bd. of Review, 137 Wis. 2d 623, 405 N.W.2d 344
(1987); Bischoffv. City of Appleton, 81 Wis. 2d 612, 260 N.W.2d 773 (1978); State ex rel Geipel
v. City of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 726, 229 N.W.2d 585 (1975); State ex rel. Markarian v. City of
Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970); State ex rel. Evansville Mercantile Ass'n v. City
of Evansville, 1 Wis. 2d 40, 82 N.W.2d 899 (1957); Fontana v. Village of Fontana-on-Geneva
Lake, 107 Wis. 2d 226, 319 N.W.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1982), af'd, 111 Wis. 2d 215, 330 N.W.2d 211
(1983); State ex reL Wisconsin Edison Corp. v. Robertson, 99 Wis. 2d 561, 299 N.W.2d 626 (Ct.
App. 1980).
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v. State2 2 illustrates. The court cited the rule that the assessor's valuation
is prima facie correct.2 °3 The plaintiff's demonstration that during one year
its assessment increased by fifty-seven percent, although the assessment of
residential property in its taxation district remained constant, did not con-
vince the court.2"4 The court also held that unless the taxpayer could show
that it was improperly assessed, it could not successfully attack the consti-
tutionality of an assessment plan under which one-fourth of the manufac-
turing property in a district was reassessed from actual view every year.
Although the paper company showed that the assessments of the revalued
property rose much more than the assessments of other property, that
showing had no effect on the court.2z 5 An argument can be made that the
court ought to have considered the possibility that cyclical revaluation is
per se nonuniform. Even if that process would eventually create uniform
treatment, there is a difference between paying a higher tax for four years
and paying a higher tax for one year.
Like other taxes, the property tax is computed by multiplying a base by
a rate. If the base (assessed value) is subject to the uniformity requirement,
the rate should be as well. The court in Knowlton held: "The valuation
must be uniform, the rate must be uniform. ' 20 6 There are no cases in which
the rate by itself, rather than in combination with the base, is at issue. A
court would no doubt find unconstitutional the application of different rates
to different property.
Only one case, Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of
Menomonie2 7 deals with the uniformity clause's relation to the payee of
property taxes. That case is important because it holds that tax incremental
financing, a major economic development tool that significantly affects the
property tax system and local finance, does not violate the uniformity clause
or any other constitutional provision. Under the Tax Increment Law,208
any city may, after complying with certain procedural requirements includ-
ing obtaining the permission of a review board, create a tax incremental
district. The city may then make expenditures to facilitate development in
that district. For fifteen years after the last expenditure or until the district
is dissolved, whichever occurs first, the taxes imposed on the property in the
202. 82 Wis. 2d 491, 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978).
203. Id. at 508, 263 N.W.2d at 186-87.
204. Id. at 508, 263 N.W.2d at 187.
205. Id. at 510, 263 N.W.2d at 187.
206. Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 378, 389 (1859).
207. 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288 N.W.2d 85 (1980). The result as it relates to the uniformity clause
comports with 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 194 (1976).
208. WIs. STAT. § 66.46 (1991-92).
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district minus the taxes that would have been imposed on the property on
the basis of its value before the creation of the district (the difference is the
tax increment) are not paid to all the taxing jurisdictions that contain the
property but to a special fund from which money is drawn to repay the city
for its expenditures in the district. Those taxes are paid by all of the city's
taxpayers, not only by the taxpayers in the district. The court concluded
that this arrangement merely changes the payee of the taxes.20 9 The court
failed to note many other effects of that law.
Quite aside from the question of whether the Tax Incremental Law is
effective as an economic development tool,210 the law precludes taxing juris-
dictions other than the city that created the district from taxing the incre-
mental value of the property in the district. This includes not only the
increment caused by the city's expenditures and development allegedly in-
duced by that creation, but also the increment caused by other factors such
as the normal appreciation of property values. Because the mill rate for the
state forestation tax is set by statute,211 creating a tax incremental district
does not affect the state tax paid by persons who do not own property in the
district. Creating it will slightly reduce the amount of money available for
state forestation purposes. Taxpayers in special districts that include the
tax incremental district may be affected, depending on the scenario that
applies. Their mill rates may increase because the tax increment is not sub-
ject to their district's tax. That effect will not be great because the levy of
most special districts is not great. The taxing jurisdictions that may be sub-
ject to major effects are counties, school districts, and vocational, technical,
and adult education districts. Residents of the city may be subject to higher
taxes for the same reasons that residents of the other jurisdictions may be
subject to them, and they certainly will have to pay the taxes on the increase
in the district's value.
209. Sigma Tau Gamma, 93 Wis. 2d at 412, 288 N.W.2d at 94.
210. To assess benefits in a specific instance one must work through the three possible scena-
rios: (1) that development would not have occurred during the existence of the tax incremental
district but for the creation of that district; (2) that the same development would have occurred
even without creation of the district; and (3) that development of another kind would have oc-
curred in that district had not the development induced by the creation of the district precluded it.
To determine, under the first scenario, whether creation of the district would result in economic
development, the following must be estimated: (1) whether jobs were actually created or merely
transferred from other businesses; (2) whether the increased services required to be funded by the
city and the loss of shared revenue are balanced by the benefits to the district; and (3) whether the
detriments to other businesses in the city are balanced by the benefits to the businesses aided by
the creation of the district.
211. Wis. STAT. § 70.58 (1991-92).
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Tax incremental financing also has had an impact on major state aid
payments. The basic theory of school aid2" 2 is that the levy rate that a
school district is willing to impose on itself, not the value of the taxable
property in that district, should determine the revenue available to the dis-
trict. The state equalizes the property tax base of school districts by distrib-
uting aid based in part on a guaranteed valuation. That is, allowing for
certain disequalizing factors in the formula,2" 3 the state will pay a dollar in
school aid to recompense a district for every dollar it loses because its prop-
erty tax base is lower than average. Until recently, the creation of a tax
incremental district affected school aid payments because the property tax
base of the district for calculating school aid was the full value of the prop-
erty in the district, excluding a minor adjustment but including the value of
tax increments, 214 even though the district received no part of the tax on
that increment. School districts that contained tax incremental districts re-
ceived supplemental aid that partially reimbursed them for the lost taxes,215
but that aid was not fully funded. Therefore, these school districts lost
some revenue. Under an act that took effect August 1993, in calculating
school aid, the value of the tax increment is excluded and supplemental aid
is no longer disbursed.21 6
Similarly, state aid to vocational, technical, and adult education dis-
tricts" 7 is based partly on an equalization index designed to assist property-
poor districts in generating needed revenue. That index is based partly on
the full value of the taxable property in the district, including tax incre-
ments.218 Therefore, creation of a tax incremental district in a vocational,
technical, and adult education district will lower the district's state aid
without increasing its property tax base.
Shared revenue payments 21 9 are made to municipalities and counties by
a formula designed in part to provide additional revenue for property-poor
jurisdictions. In determining the tax base for that formula, tax increments
are included for municipalities and excluded for counties. Cities, therefore,
receive less shared revenue. This loss in shared revenue increases the bur-
den of other property taxpayers in the city. Although the uniformity clause
212. WIS. STAT. ch. 121, subch. 11 (1991-92).
213. The most significant factor is the preclusion of "negative aid" (property-rich districts
paying money that can be sent to property-poor districts). Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247
N.W. 2d 141 (1976); see infra text accompanying note 249.
214. Wis. STAT. § 121.004(2) (1991-92).
215. Wis. STAT. § 121.085 (1991-92).
216. 1993 Wisconsin Act 16.
217. Wis. STAT. § 38.28 (1991-92).
218. WiS. STAT. § 38.28(lm)(b).
219. WIS. STAT. ch. 79, subch. 1 (1991-92).
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is irrelevant to the size of a property tax levy, these effects indicate that it is
inadequate to limit a uniformity clause analysis of tax incremental financing
to determining who is the payee.
Moreover, the uniformity clause's prohibition of partial property tax ex-
emptions is relevant to tax incremental districts. At first glance, property in
a tax incremental district is not partially exempt. Such property is assessed
as is other property in the city, and the same rate is applied to it that is
applied to other property located in the same taxing jurisdictions. This rea-
soning provided a basis for the court to find uniformity in Sigma Tau
Gamma.
In reality, however, something quite different occurs. The property
taxes on the tax increment do not go to the taxing jurisdictions; rather, they
go to the tax incremental fund to repay project costs. Some of those costs,
such as those for public improvements,220 would ordinarily be funded by
special assessments imposed on the property that benefitted from them.
The reality in regard to those costs is that the property indirectly receives a
partial exemption in the amount of the special assessments that it would
pay but for the creation of the tax incremental district. Other costs are
professional service costs, capital costs, financing costs, real property assem-
bly costs, and several other costs, nearly all of which would ordinarily be
borne by the property owner. The property indirectly receives a partial
exemption in the amount of those costs because the owner actually receives
a loan from the city and pays back a small part of it (the other taxpayers in
the city pay most of it) annually by depositing a sum in the tax incremental
fund. The owner of property in a tax incremental district also receives a
partial exemption for the taxes levied on that property by other taxing
jurisdictions.
The next stage in the property tax process, enforcement, has rarely been
litigated in uniformity clause cases. At issue in State ex rel. Hammermill
Paper Co. v. La Plante22' was a statutory provision specifying that unpaid
taxes on property to which the industrial projects law222 applies do not be-
come a lien. The court held that "[a] lien is not an essential element of.
uniform taxation." '223 The plaintiff in State ex rel. Blockwitz v. Diehl224
argued that holders of tax certificates were treated nonuniformly because
counties were directed by statute to buy land if the taxes on it were delin-
220. See Wis. STAT. § 66.46(2)(1) (1991-92).
221. 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973).
222. See Wis. STAT. § 66.521(9) (1973).
223. Hammermill, 58 Wis. 2d at 73, 205 N.W.2d at 807.
224. 198 Wis. 326, 223 N.W. 852 (1929).
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quent. Rather than holding that enforcement of property taxes was not
subject to the uniformity clause, the court held that uniformity applied
throughout the county with respect to the treatment of tax certificates.225
These two cases conflict on whether the uniformity clause applies to en-
forcement. However, Hammermill was decided much later and appears to
take a more logical approach.
The court has found that the uniformity clause is irrelevant to boards of
review. Except for negotiation with an assessor and appeals to a board of
assessors in municipalities that have such boards, the first forum for ap-
pealing a property tax assessment is the board of review.226 The court in
State ex rel Milwaukee Street Railway v. Anderson 227 decided that differ-
ences in forming a board of review do not violate the uniformity clause. In
another early case, Strange v. Oconto Land Co.,228 at issue was a statute that
directed one town to assess property of another town if the latter did not
assess its own property. Furthermore, the statute provided that there
would be no board of review in towns that did not assess their own prop-
erty. The court found no violation of the uniformity clause, not because the
clause is inapplicable to enforcement, but because the statute covering this
type of assessment predated the statute requiring boards of review. The
result seems correct, although the reasoning is unusual.
Uniformity clause cases about the use of property tax revenue present
unusual difficulties. Three such cases involved the use of property taxes to
pay certain costs. In the first, State ex rel. McCurdy v. Tappan,229 the chal-
lenged statute required the Town of Oshkosh, but no other municipality, to
reimburse another municipality for an incorrect bounty payment to a Civil
War veteran. According to the court, this differential treatment and re-
quired payment in the absence of a local benefit caused the statute to violate
the uniformity clause.23° In Milwaukee County v. Halsey,231 one of the
counties that was required to supplement the state salary paid to a circuit
judge alleged that the uniformity clause was violated because that require-
ment did not apply to some other counties. The court, as it had in other
cases that presented conceptual difficulties, resorted to classifying property
and finding uniformity within each classification.232 In a similar case,2 33 at
225. Id. at 333, 223 N.W. at 855.
226. Wis. STAT. § 70.47 (1991-92).
227. 90 Wis. 550, 63 N.W. 746 (1895).
228. 136 Wis. 516, 117 N.W. 1023 (1908).
229. 29 Wis. 664 (1872).
230. Id. at 678.
231. 149 Wis. 82, 136 N.W. 139 (1912).
232. Id. at 93, 136 N.W. at 143.
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issue was the payment of property taxes to fund a reassessment. The court
considered this to be a local expense, so the levying of local taxes for it did
not violate the uniformity clause.234 These cases seem to conflict, but per-
haps the distinguishing characteristic is that in the first case, the tax pay-
ment was not used to fund a municipal expense but rather to compensate an
individual for services rendered to the nation. This distinction, however,
has at best a tangential relation to the purposes of the uniformity clause.
In more difficult cases about the use of property tax revenue, a party
argued that some owners of property were being taxed for enterprises that
did not benefit them. In Thielen v. Metropolitan Sewerage Commission,235
the plaintiff argued that a property tax was levied partly to fund bonds that
would not benefit some of the property taxed. The court, however, found
that all the taxed property would benefit in some way from the funded
bonds.236 In other cases, the plaintiffs did show that the use of the tax
proceeds did not benefit the taxed property. In the most recent of those
cases, but not in the six earlier ones, the court held that the uniformity
clause was violated.
Three of the early cases involved municipalities that were required by
statute to contribute funds for a bridge that was constructed in another
municipality in the same county. The court in those three cases found no
violation of the uniformity clause, although the court used different ratio-
nales. In State ex rel. Town of Baraboo v. Board of Supervisors,2 3 the town
decided to build a bridge, but because the cost exceeded a certain percent-
age of the town's equalized value, it billed the county for half the cost, as
authorized by statute. The county, under the same statute, was not allowed
to collect funds to pay that cost by levying a tax on municipalities that
maintained their own bridges. The court held that such a scheme did not
violate the uniformity clause because it operated in the same way through-.
out the state.238 In Rinder v. City of Madison,239 at issue was a levy, for
bridges, on Dane County, including Madison, even though Madison's
streets were not part of the county highway system. The court looked at
the law's operation in two geographical contexts: "It is a general law oper-
ating uniformly throughout the state and upon the residents within each
233. See State ex reL Attorney Gen. v. Hammerlund, 159 Wis. 315, 150 N.W. 512 (1915).
234. Id. at 318, 150 N.W. at 513.
235. 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.W. 484 (1922).
236. IA at 56, 189 N.W. at 492-93.
237. 70 Wis. 485, 36 N.W. 396 (1888).
238. Id. at 489, 36 N.W. at 397-98.
239. 163 Wis. 525, 158 N.W. 302 (1916).
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county."'"' In State ex rel. Owen v. Stevenson ,241 the taxpayer argued that
the proceeds of a county tax were used to pay for bridges benefiting another
county and that some municipalities that had built bridges without aid were
required to help pay for other municipalities' bridges. The court declined to
assess benefits and their relation to burdens,242 stating that "[w]ant of uni-
formity of taxation does not exist in a local sense unless a different rate of
taxation is imposed on like property within the same jurisdiction."243 The
implication that the uniformity clause is irrelevant to the use of revenue is
promising.
In two of the three other cases of this type in which no violation of the
uniformity clause was found, the court, as it did in Baraboo and Rinder,
tested uniformity within the jurisdiction that levied the tax. A county levy
to pay a sum to the state was approved by the court in Lund v. Chippewa
County2" because the levy operated uniformly throughout the county. An
opposite financial arrangement existed in State ex rel. City of New Rich-
mond v. Davidson.245 The state appropriated money to forgive a trust fund
loan made to New Richmond. The court in that case also made a geo-
graphical-scope analysis but concluded, somewhat unconvincingly, that the
whole state benefitted from the expenditure. In Columbia County v. Wis-
consin Retirement Fund,2 4 6 the other case in which the court found no vio-
lation of the uniformity clause, the court made explicit that which was
implicit in Owen: "The state aids and taxes allocated to a county are not
collected or returned by the county by any method or in any sense contem-
plated by sec. 1, art. VIII."2 47 It added that this case dealt with the distri-
bution of revenue, "not with the assessment or collection of direct taxes on
real estate." '248 After Columbia County, the line between property tax is-
sues that are subject to the uniformity clause and those that are not seemed
logical: The line lay just after the collection of the revenue.
However, in Buse v. Smith,2 49 the line moved. This case is significant
because it prevented the reallocation of vast sums of money. In spite of the
seven cases beginning with Baraboo and ending with Columbia County, the
court held that the uniformity clause applied to the use of revenue and that,
240. Id. at 531, 158 N.W. at 304.
241. 164 Wis. 569, 161 N.W. 1 (1917).
242. Id. at 580, 161 N.W. at 5.
243. Id.
244. 93 Wis. 640, 67 N.W. 927 (1896).
245. 114 Wis. 563, 88 N.W. 596 (1902).
246. 17 Wis. 2d 310, 116 N.W.2d 142 (1962).
247. Id. at 325, 116 N.W.2d at 150.
248. Id.
249. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
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under the clause, property-rich school districts may not be forced to levy
taxes to produce revenue that can be cycled through the school aid formula
to pay aids to property-poor school districts.250 To support its analysis of
the plaintiff's uniformity clause argument, the court cited Owen and New
Richmond.251 However, the court adverted only to the public purpose sec-
tion of the former, and the uniformity clause was not even an issue in the
latter. The court then turned to Lund, in which it conceded that there was
no uniformity clause violation and remarked that the levy at issue was vol-
untary. The court cited dicta in Lund to the effect that the result would be
different if the levy were mandatory. The court did not mention that earlier
cases had approved a mandatory expense that was paid for with property
tax revenue. The court then cited some dicta from a variety of cases, in-
cluding a railroad case, in regard to public purpose. The negative aid
scheme may be unconstitutional under the public purpose doctrine or under
another doctrine, but Buse badly distorted the uniformity clause case law by
confusing doctrines, ignoring relevant precedents, and citing dicta.
In summary, the case law on the uniformity clause does not reveal a
point in the property tax process where a definite line can be drawn separat-
ing the events to which the clause applies from those to which it does not
apply. A line can be drawn immediately after the collection of revenue, but
anomalous cases on both sides of that line cast doubt on the correctness of
its location.
Courts have also tried a conceptual approach, attributing different qual-
ities to the elements of the system to which the clause applies than to the
elements to which it does not apply. The first attempt of that kind occurred
in Knowlton, in which the court mandated that "the course or mode of
proceeding in levying or laying taxes shall be uniform. '252 Unfortunately,
that category is very general. In another early case the court held that
"[tihe machinery of taxation-the mode of levying, assessing, and collect-
ing-is subject entirely to [the legislature's] discretion. 2 53 This holding
moves the "mode of levying" the tax to the side of the line opposite where
Knowlton placed it. Much later, in Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee,254 the
court used a similar metaphor: "There can be variations in the mechanics
of property assessment or tax imposition so long as the resulting taxation
250. It at 579, 247 N.W.2d at 155. This type of arrangement is sometimes called negative
aid. See id. at 573, 247 N.W.2d. at 152.
251. Id. at 577, 247 N.W.2d at 153-54.
252. Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 378, 389 (1859).
253. Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556, 565 (1863).
254. 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d. 633 (1967).
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shall be borne with as nearly as practicable equality on an ad valorem basis
with other taxable property. 255
Other courts have drawn a contrast not between abstract principles and
machine-like methods, but between important and unimportant considera-
tions. One court wrote that assessing value and applying rates must be uni-
form, but "[f]aws as regards mere details, designed to be aids in applying
the rule, may or may not violate it according as they reasonably are in
furtherance of it or are manifestly otherwise. ' 256 In other words, a stan-
dard other than uniformity applies to "details." Similarly, according to an
early court, "[a]bsolute uniformity in every detail in the assessment of prop-
erty is impracticable, if not unattainable." '257 The difficulty with this ap-
proach is in determining whether a statutory provision or an administrative
action is merely a detail or whether it implicates "the rule." Although this
conceptual approach is flexible enough to ignore trivialities, it is also too
vague to be of much use to judges who are looking for rational principles
for deciding uniformity clause cases.
VII. PROPERTY TAX RELIEF
Despite the anomalies of Buse v. Smith,258 a long sequence of cases indi-
cates that a discrepancy in benefits received from tax revenue by a taxing
jurisdiction does not violate the uniformity clause. In fact, Columbia
County v. Wisconsin Retirement Fund 259 suggests that the court may now
be unwilling to apply the uniformity clause to the use of tax revenue. How-
ever, State ex reL La Follette v. Torphy26 recently established a logical ex-
ception to the general rule implicit in Columbia County. The relation
between the uniformity clause and property tax relief,'at issue in Torphy,
has become increasingly important. Torphy involved the Improvements
Tax Relief Law, under which an income tax credit would offset increases in
property taxes that resulted from improvements to houses and garages.
Although some eligibility requirements related to claimants, the court held
that the credit was based on "characteristics of particular properties and
not those of the taxpayer."' 26' Therefore, the credit was part of the property
tax process and had to conform to the uniformity clause. The court distin-
guished Columbia County on the grounds that the credit in La Follette was
255. Id. at 424, 147 N.W.2d at 641-42.
256. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 613, 108 N.W. 557, 570 (1906).
257. Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Lincoln County, 57 Wis. 137, 142, 15 N.W. 121, 123 (1883).
258. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
259. 17 Wis. 2d 310, 116 N.W.2d 142 (1962).
260. 85 Wis. 2d 94, 270 N.W.2d 187 (1978).
261. Id. at 104, 270 N.W.2d at 191.
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a payment to individuals that reduced their property tax burden and thus
created a partial exemption in violation of the uniformity clause.262 That is,
the use of tax revenue to reduce individuals' property taxes may violate the
uniformity clause.
The uniformity clause may apply also to aids granted to jurisdictions
that impose property taxes or to individuals subject to those taxes. That
issue has major significance because a very large portion of the state budget
is devoted to those aids. For example, under the state budget bill for the
1991-93 biennium, 38.2% of the expenditures were made for local assist-
ance. Two major programs of this kind, general school aids and shared
revenue,263 have been dealt with in passing. Both are direct payments cal-
culated by elaborate formulas that include equalizing factors designed to
aid property-poor jurisdictions. Those aids probably do not violate the uni-
formity clause because their relation to property tax obligations is tenuous,
partly because a taxing jurisdiction that receives aid will not necessarily
reduce property taxes accordingly.
The third giant state aid program, Wisconsin State Property Tax Relief
(WSPTR),2 4 presents a more complicated problem because a statute di-
rects that funds allocated to taxing jurisdictions under it shall directly re-
duce the property tax bills of the owners of property in the jurisdictions.265
Those aid payments are reflected as property tax credits. Because of the
direct crediting, it would seem that La Follette is a relevant precedent and
that WSPTR is subject to the uniformity clause. Because the payment is
allocated proportionally to property tax bills, there is uniformity in the
sense of treating all taxpayers alike.
Municipalities reallocate WSPTR funds to other taxing jurisdictions for
which they collect taxes. That reallocation is proportional, based on
amounts levied by those jurisdictions and applied to the property tax bills
issued by the municipality. This multijurisdictional nature of the property
tax bill perhaps creates another uniformity clause problem because the
amount of the credit is computed initially for municipalities, which are not
coterminous with other jurisdictions. As a result, two taxpayers owning
property located in the same county, school district, or vocational, techni-
cal, and adult education district, and subject to the same total amount of
gross property taxes, probably will not receive the same WSPTR credit and
thus will not have the same net property tax bill.
262. Id. at 105-08, 270 N.W.2d at 192.
263. See Wis. STAT. ch. 121, subch. II and ch. 78, subch. 1 (1991-92).
264. Wis. STAT. ch. 79, subch. 11 (1991-92).
265. See Wis. STAT. § 79.10(9) (1991-92).
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WSPTR is subject to another possible uniformity clause problem be-
cause it is directly applied to property tax bills. An argument can be made
that WSPTR, therefore, creates a partial exemption similar to the one that
the court disapproved in La Follette. The taxpayer does not pay the total
bill and later receive a check for the amount of the credit. Moreover, this
credit does not have the attributes that, as we shall see in the next para-
graph, induced the court to approve the homestead credit. Thus, in regard
to both uniformity in the usual sense and partial exemption, case law does
not allow a confident prediction that a court would find WSPTR constitu-
tional under the uniformity clause.
The uniformity clause may also apply to other programs under which
the state uses its revenue or forgoes collecting revenue in order to lighten
property tax burdens. In State ex rel. Harvey v. Morgan,2 66 the court held
that the homestead credit,267 which either reduces income tax liability or
results in a direct payment to a citizen, does not violate the uniformity
clause. In fact, the court found the credit to be a relief provision, not a
property tax provision; thus, the uniformity clause does not even apply to
the homestead credit.268 In arriving at its conclusion, the court was swayed
by the revised statement of the credit's purpose, which alluded to the police
power, the income test of eligibility, the payment of the credit to renters,
the credit's connection to the income tax, and the fact that recipients of the
credit pay their full property tax bills.269 The court distinguished Ehrlich
on the ground that the contract in Ehrlich "directly related to specific prop-
erty taxes"27 and bargained away "the city's police power to levy taxes." '271
However, the unit of government offering the credit should not matter
under the uniformity clause analysis. The reference to the police power to
tax is confusing in light of the court's approval of the homestead credit
partly as an instance of the police power. It is also confusing in light of
earlier uniformity clause cases in which the court contrasted the taxing
power and the police power. The point about the specificity of the arrange-
ment in Ehrlich compared to the more complicated formula and purpose of
the homestead credit is more convincing.
The school property tax credit27 2 resembles the homestead credit be-
cause it is part of the income tax system, it does not directly reduce prop-
266. 30 Wis. 2d 1, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966).
267. See WIs. STAT. ch. 71, subch. VIII (1991-92).
268. Harvey, 30 Wis. 2d at 10, 139 N.W.2d at 588-89.
269. Id. at 13-14, 139 N.W.2d at 590-91.
270. Id. at 15, 139 N.W.2d at 591.
271. Id.
272. See Wis. STAT. § 71.07(9) (1991-92).
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erty tax bills (although it is measured by property taxes or by rent
constituting property taxes), and it is available to renters. However, the
school property tax credit differs from the homestead credit because it does
not have an income test. Since the similarities appear to outweigh the dif-
ference, a court would probably find that this credit does not create a par-
tial exemption.
Property tax deferral2 73 allows certain elderly homeowners to defer pay-
ment of property taxes until their death or until their home is sold. The
program has an income test and defers rather than reduces property taxes.
Thus, there is an increased likelihood that property tax deferral is constitu-
tional, although the Attorney General opined that an earlier bill that would
have created a similar program would be unconstitutional.274
The uniformity clause is also a factor for certain economic incentive
programs that use revenue or forgo the collection of property tax revenue.
Cases on tax incremental financing,275 the improvements tax relief credit,276
and the Urban Redevelopment Law277 have been discussed. A law review
note and an Attorney General's Opinion 278 argued cogently that a similar
statutory provision granting a tax exemption for property in a conservation
district 279 was unconstitutional. The uniformity clause thus supplies resist-
ance to legislative efforts to fashion economic incentives for the develop-
ment of land.
In contrast, the 1927 amendment to article VIII, section 1, which allows
differential treatment of forests and agricultural land, makes it possible to
create constitutional property tax incentives for certain programs that are
designed to prevent development by retaining land in its current condition.
Those programs are the forest croplands law,280 the woodland tax law,281
the managed forest land program,282 and the farmland preservation
credit.283 The 1974 amendment to the uniformity clause allowed taxation
of agricultural land in ways that are not uniform with the taxation of other
property, although the taxation of any agricultural property must be uni-
273. See Wis. STAT. §§ 16.993-.997 (1991-92).
274. 52 Op. Att'y Gen. 257 (1963).
275. See Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288
N.W.2d 85 (1980).
276. See State ex rel. La Follette v. Torphy, 85 Wis. 2d 94, 270 N.W.2d 187 (1978).
277. See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
278. See generally 66 Op. Atty. Gen. 326 (1977); Kinnamon, supra note 2.
279. Wis. STAT. § 70.11(24) (1963).
280. Wis. STAT. ch. 77, subch. 1 (1991-92).
281. Wis. STAT. § 77.16 (1991-92).
282. Wis. STAT. ch. 77, subch. VI (1991-92).
283. Wis. STAT. ch. 71, subch. IX (1991-92).
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form with the taxation of all other agricultural property. That requirement
was the subject of McManus v. Department of Revenue,284 which involved a
challenge to the farmland preservation credit. The taxpayer argued that the
statute under which owners of farmland could not receive the credit if their
family's income was above a certain level was unconstitutional because it
resulted in differential treatment of taxpayers who in all relevant respects
except their family income were identical. The court decided that the farm-
land preservation credit, like the homestead credit, was a relief measure and
thus not subject to the uniformity clause, even though its income limit was
close to $40,000.
VIII. THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OVER WHICH UNIFORMITY Is
TESTED
As we have seen, the geographical area over which uniformity must pre-
vail is occasionally a crucial issue. Most courts agree that the tax must be
uniform throughout the jurisdiction that levies it. As with other uniformity
clause issues, there are a few maverick cases. Again, Knowlton v. Board of
Supervisors2.5 is the seminal case. One reason for the acceptance of the rule
appeared in Jensen v. Board of Supervisors,286 a case where the use of funds
was subject to the rule of uniformity. At issue was a requirement that coun-
ties build roads, thus burdening counties differently. The court recognized
that, if it applied a statewide standard of uniformity, no tax could withstand
scrutiny.287 In Lund v. Chippewa County,28 8 the court clearly stated that
the taxing unit is the unit over which a tax must be uniform. In Village of
West Milwaukee v. Area Board of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educa-
tion,28 9 the court, although recognizing the statewide importance of educa-
tion, held that the tax to support it was levied by each vocational, technical,
and adult education district, and that uniformity within each district
sufficed.290
One of the few cases that takes a different view of the uniformity
clause's geographical scope is State ex rel. Town of Baraboo v. Board of
291Supervisors. In validating a requirement that certain municipalities helppay for bridges in other counties, the court noted that the use of funds,
284. 155 Wis. 2d 450, 455 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1990).
285. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
286. 47 Wis. 298, 2 N.W. 320 (1879).
287. Id. at 314, 2 N.W. at 331-32.
288. 93 Wis. 640, 67 N.W. 927 (1896).
289. 51 Wis. 2d 356, 187 N.W.2d 387 (1971).
290. Id. at 379-80, 187 N.W.2d at 397-98.
291. 70 Wis. 485, 36 N.W. 396 (1888).
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without a direct reduction of property tax bills, must be uniform. Yet the
court did not hold, as did the court in Jensen, that uniformity within a
taxing jurisdiction is all that is required. Rather, the court held that the
statute requiring the payments operated uniformly throughout the state.2 92
In a later bridge case, Rinder v. City of Milwaukee,29 a the court combined
the views of Jensen and Baraboo: "It is a general law operating uniformly
throughout the state and upon the residents within each county."2 94 Per-
haps in these three bridge cases it would have been better to hold that,
unless there is a direct reduction of property tax bills, the use of revenue
need not be uniform. Absent that holding, the approach in Jensen is best
for the reasons stated in that opinion.
Like the court in Rinder, the court in Chicago & Northwestern Railway
v. State295 used two geographical criteria. As stated earlier, the latter case
is quite confusing. At one point, the court asserted that "[a]ll taxation on
property, as near as practicable, shall bear thereon, relatively equally as to
value, throughout the state. ' 296 Specifically, it stated that determination of
value and application of rates must be uniform statewide.297 At another
point, however, the court spoke of unity "throughout each taxing
jurisdiction. '298
Thus, two of the cases that demand statewide uniformity for a local tax
are equivocal, and the third conflicts with other cases brought on similar
facts and probably should have been decided on other grounds. The best,
most commonly accepted rule is that uniformity is required throughout the
taxing jurisdiction that levies the tax.
IX. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
The issue of classification has arisen in several different contexts. There-
fore, a more extensive treatment of it would be useful. The initial inquiry is
whether any classification is constitutionally permissible. In Knowlton v.
Board of Supervisors,2' the court held that classification is equivalent to
instituting different rules of taxation and is therefore unconstitutional. 3"
As we have seen, another sequence of early cases approved classification,
292. Id at 489, 36 N.W. at 398.
293. 163 Wis. 525, 158 N.W. 302 (1916).
294. Id at 531, 158 N.W. at 304.
295. 128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
296. Id at 608, 108 N.W. at 569.
297. Id. at 612, 108 N.W. at 570.
298. Id at 614, 108 N.W. at 571.
299. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
300. Id. at 390-91.
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but required uniformity within a class. The Knowlton view has prevailed.
In Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. State,3"1 which is otherwise problem-
atical, the court correctly held that "[flor the direct method, the constitu-
tion puts all property chosen therefor into one class."3"2 A more recent
case, Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee,30 3 propounded a list of uniformity
clause principles, the first of which is "[flor direct taxation of property,
under the uniformity rule there can be but one constitutional class.',31
However, classification of matters to which the uniformity clause does
not apply, such as "mere details," is valid. Classification between exempt
and taxable property is generally valid-a result of the legislature's power
under the uniformity clause to specify the property that is taxable. One of
the principles expressed in Gottlieb is that "the legislature can classify as
between property that is to be taxed and that which is to be wholly ex-
empt., 30 5 However, recently the court has held that an exemption may not
be granted to only some members of a class.
In several early cases, courts decided that classes with only a few mem-
bers that exclude apparently similar kinds of property were valid. For ex-
ample, in Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Outagamie County,3 °6 the
court held that an exemption for Turner Halls was valid because the entire
class of Turner Halls was exempt. One could argue that it would have been
more reasonable to require exemption of all nonprofit sports and recrea-
tional facilities or otherwise make the exempt class broader. Similarly, in
Holt Lumber Co. v. City of Oconto,307 the court found saw logs to be a
reasonable class.
A hint that the court eventually would disapprove of very narrow
classes appeared in a dissent in Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Taylor
County,30 8 which argued that a temporary exemption granted to one rail-
road was constitutionally invalid because of its limited application. 30 9 That
dissent is sound because the rule it states would help prevent political cor-
ruption. Later, the seed planted by that dissent took root. In Board of
Trustees of Lawrence University v. Outagamie County,310 the court ex-
301. 128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
302. Id. at 604, 108 N.W. at 567.
303. 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
304. Id. at 424, 147 N.W.2d at 641.
305. Id.
306. 76 Wis. 587, 45 N.W. 536 (1890).
307. 145 Wis. 500, 130 N.W. 709 (1911).
308. 52 Wis. 37, 96-97, 8 N.W. 833, 856 (1881) (Orton, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
309. Id. (Orton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
310. 150 Wis. 244, 136 N.W. 619 (1912).
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amined a situation in which the university's statutory charter exempted all
of its property, whereas a more general statute exempted only up to forty
acres of university land. The juxtaposition of those two exemptions re-
quired the court to consider the issue of exclusive classes. The court ruled
that "[w]hen we are presented with a case in which the exemption is arbi-
trary and in which other persons of the same class owning property of the
same general description are awarded exemptions of a lesser amount, the
situation is one in which the rule of uniformity is violated." '311 Similarly,
the Attorney General has stated that granting exemptions to one orphan
asylum, as well as to property owned by a Wisconsin Lions International
club, would violate the uniformity clause.312 In light of Lawrence Univer-
sity, several current property tax exemptions are suspect.3 13
One of the more unusual classifications approved by the court was liti-
gated in Columbia Hospital Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee.314 At issue was the
application of an exemption for hospital property 15 to property that a hos-
pital rented to employees. The court found the upper unit of the building to
be exempt and the lower unit to be taxable. The court reasoned that the
two parts of the building were "distinct and separate units and can consti-
tute different classifications on the basis of use."1316
Courts have devised several tests for determining a classification's valid-
ity. In Estate of Heuel v. State,317 the court held that uniformity "means
simply taxation which acts alike on all persons similarly situated. 31  An-
other approach is to examine not the similarity of the members of each
class, but the differences between the members of two classes. In one case,
the court found that treating Blue Cross differently from commercial insur-
ers was justified because there were real differences between those two
classes and the classification was rational.31 9 A more common test has been
reasonableness. In State v. Whitcom,320 the court declined to decide
whether a peddler's license was a tax or a means of police power regulation,
and it used what appeared to be an equal protection test. That test also was
311. Id. at 249, 136 N.W. at 621.
312. See generally 54 Op. Att'y Gen. 60 (1965); 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 419 (1951).
313. See Wis. STAT. § 70.11 (1991-92).
314. 35 Wis. 2d 660, 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967).
315. See Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4m) (1991-92).
316. Columbia Hosp., 35 Wis. 2d at 675, 151 N.W.2d at 757.
317. 4 Wis. 2d 400, 90 N.W.2d 634 (1958).
318. Id. at 404, 90 N.W.2d at 637.
319. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 447, 472, 109 N.W.2d
271, 283 (1960).
320. 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468 (1904).
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used in Nash Sales, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee.321 The Gottlieb court was
sufficiently confident that this rule was solidly established and added it to
the list of uniformity clause principles.322 Each of these tests has some
value, but each is vague. Courts virtually are left to make an ad hoc, almost
intuitive determination.
X. REMEDIES FOR SUCCESSFUL UNIFORMITY CLAUSE LITIGANTS
Courts have granted several remedies to successful uniformity clause
litigants. Many of the early cases were brought to prevent a taxing jurisdic-
tion from using certain collection methods. The court granted that remedy
in the second and third cases in which a violation of the clause was found.
In Weeks v. City of Milwaukee,323 the court issued an injunction to stop a
sale of property. In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Winnebago Lake &
Fox River Plankroad,324 it quashed a writ of mandamus requiring payment.
An unusual remedy was granted in Ehrlich v. City of Racine,325 in which
the taxing jurisdiction was the plaintiff and in which the court voided a
contract between the parties. A more serious remedy was granted in cases
in which the court recognized that if one party was incorrectly assessed, the
owner of every other piece of taxable property in the jurisdiction paid an
incorrect amount since the total amount levied by the taxing jurisdiction
remained constant. For that reason, the court in Slauson v. City of Ra-
cine 326 voided the jurisdiction's entire levy. In Knowlton v. Board of Super-
visors,327 the court ordered a reassessment of the jurisdiction retroactively
for four years. In Tallman v. City of Janesville,328 suit was brought by a
purchaser of land who had learned that Knowlton voided the taxes in ques-
tion. However, the case was brought before the reassessment. Addition-
ally, the specter of a reassessment extending back seven years encouraged
the court at the rehearing of Kneeland v. City of Milwaukee329 to find that
the uniformity clause had not been violated. More recently, a common
remedy has been ordering the reassessment only of the plaintiff's
property.33 °
321. 198 Wis. 281, 224 N.W. 126 (1929).
322. Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 424, 147 N.W.2d 633, 641 (1967).
323. 10 Wis. 186 (1860).
324. 11 Wis. 34 (1860).
325. 26 Wis. 2d 352, 132 N.W.2d 489 (1965).
326. 13 Wis. 444 (1861).
327. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
328. 17 Wis. 73 (1863).
329. 15 Wis. 497 (1862).
330. See, e.g, State ex rel. Boostrom v. Board of Review, 42 Wis. 2d 149, 166 N.W.2d 184
(1969).
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Courts have devised several tests to determine whether to invalidate a
levy. The court in Hersey v. Board of Supervisors331 invalidated a levy be-
cause, although the improper action applied to only one piece of property, it
was intentionally unconstitutional. The intent was indeed clear; the as-
sessor had again omitted the Newhall House, a hotel, from the tax roll even
though the court in Weeks had held that omission to be a violation of the
uniformity clause. Courts have used a good-faith test several times. In
Marsh v. Board of Supervisors,332 the court voided an erroneous assessment,
since the errors were not made in good faith. A later court followed Hersey
and Weeks, holding that omissions "arising from mistakes of fact, errone-
ous computations, or errors of judgment ' 333 do not vitiate the tax, but "in-
tentional disregard of the taxing laws, which imposes illegal taxes on those
assessed, does vitiate it."'334 In Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. State,335
the court found serious errors to have been made in good faith.
XI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to find patterns in the enormous amount of case law on the
deceptively simple article VIII, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
From the case law, the court in Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee336 distilled the
following principles:
1. For direct taxation of property, under the uniformity rule there
can be but one constitutional class.
2. All within that class must be taxed on a basis of equality so far
as practicable, and all property taxed must bear its burden equally
on an ad valorem basis.
3. All property not included in that class must be absolutely ex-
empt from property taxation.
4. Privilege taxes are not direct taxes on property and are not sub-
ject to the uniformity rule.
5. While there can be no classification of property for different
rules or rates of property taxation, the legislature can classify as be-
tween property that is to be taxed and that which is to be wholly
exempt, and the test of such classification is reasonableness.
6. There can be variations in the mechanics of property assessment
or tax imposition so long as the resulting taxation shall be borne
331. 16 Wis. 198 (1862).
332. 42 Wis. 502 (1877).
333. Johnston v. City of Oshkosh, 65 Wis. 473, 477, 27 N.W. 320, 322 (1886).
334. Id.
335. 128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
336. 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
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with as nearly as practicable equality on an ad valorem basis with
other taxable property.337
I suggest adding a caveat that exceptions may be found to most of those
principles. The case law on the uniformity clause is not noted for its consis-
tency or clear-headed adherence to well-articulated rules. I also suggest
changing the fourth principle to state that the clause in the narrow sense
applies only to the property tax. Finally, it is important to recognize that
the relevant geographical scope ought to be the jurisdiction that levied the
tax, and that the clause should not apply to the disbursement of property
tax funds or any other funds unless that disbursement clearly reduces prop-
erty tax bills.
The story of the uniformity clause cannot be reduced to a brief state-
ment of allegedly black letter law. It contains inconsistencies such as the
early floundering and the later wavering, a result of an accommodation
sought between the forces urging equality and the forces urging economic
development or property tax relief. Judicial illogic occasionally exacerbated
those inconsistencies. Moreover, the clause has been applied haphazardly
or not at all to major state programs. The most important uniformity cases
may be yet to come. This is not to say that uniformity clause case law is a
disaster. Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors338 is a brilliant case, the result
and reasoning of which have held up for well over 100 years. Most other
cases make sense, particularly in light of the clause's ambiguity and the
important, complex issues involved in them. The development of the uni-
formity clause, finally, is about an abstract, indubitable principle in con-
stant contact with the infinitely varied world.
After tracing uniformity clause litigation over more than 130 years, al-
most the length of time that Wisconsin has been a state, one is tempted to
ask whether that clause, as it has been interpreted, has benefitted this state.
One commentator has asserted that state uniformity clauses in general have
created a good deal of confusion and litigation and not uniformity.339 The
amount of litigation in this state on the uniformity clause is indeed consid-
erable, averaging nearly one appellate court case per year. The clause's
most significant effect has been to constrain the legislature, rather than en-
sure equitable treatment of the small percentage of property owners who
have litigated on the basis of the clause. No one can describe, with any
justifiable confidence, the property tax system and other statutory schemes
closely related to the property tax system that the legislature would have
337. Id. at 424, 147 N.W.2d at 641-42.
338. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
339. NEWHOUSE, supra note 10, at 767.
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created had the state constitution not included a uniformity clause. At this
point there probably is no going back; the chances of repealing the clause
are minimal. The task is to go forward, to better understand the clause's
economic and social effects, to bring the statutes into better conformity with
the clause as it is correctly interpreted, and to resolve inconsistencies and
overrule errors in the case law.

